






NOTABLES AND NATIONALISM: A HISTORY OF 
 





Peter James Smith 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of 
The University of Utah 






Master of Arts  
 
 
Department of History  






























Copyright © Peter James Smith 2010 
 


















The University of Utah Graduate School 
STATEMENT OF THESIS APPROVAL 
The thesis of Peter James Smith 
has been approved by the following supervisory committee members: 
Peter Singlett , Chair 5/11110 
Date APproved 
M. Hakan Yavuz , Member 5/11110 
Date APproved 
Shireen Mahdavi-Khazeni , Member 5/11110 
Date Approved 
And by James Lehning , Chair of 
the Department of History 






 This thesis analyzes the Palestinian national movement between 1917 and 1939. It 
focuses on the social structure and economic problems in Palestinian Arab society and 
how these factors contributed to the political challenges that confronted the national 
leadership. The Palestinian Arab leaders of this era are remembered today for their 
unwillingness to accept the terms of the British Mandate. Their position stayed more or 
less consistent throughout the period under review, as did their opposition to Jewish land 
purchase and immigration to the region. These were the two major tenets of the Zionist 
movement and critical objectives of the mandate itself. The continued opposition of the 
Palestinian leaders and the persistence of the issues they faced did not amount to a static 
situation. There were various social and economic changes taking place in Palestine. 
These changes adversely affected the lower classes and weakened the position of the 
ruling class. As the plight of the Palestinians worsened, the national leaders remained 
caught in political gridlock that further eroded their position. In addition to these factors, 
there were outside forces that determined the trajectory of the Palestine mandate and the 
state of its Arab population. After World War I, a series of externally imposed political 
constraints were key factors in determining the range of political options available to the 
Palestinian leadership and the possible sources of national identity.  Living under the 
British Mandate and experiencing the effects of Jewish settlement created a common 
platform for the development of a unique Palestinian identity, one that set the Palestinians 
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apart from the other Arab peoples. Even though they coalesced as a distinct national 
people, political divisions kept the Palestinians from forming the united front that was 
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Ernest Gellner writes that nationalism is “primarily a principle which holds that 
the national and political unit should be congruent.”1 Based on this definition, it can be 
said that the establishment of a nation state is the intersection of national and political 
interests, or when a people that are bound by a collective national identity come under the 
political control of a government that embodies that identity. It is rare that political and 
national units are perfectly congruent and sometimes a people develop a distinct national 
identity without an accompanying sovereign state that embodies that identity. This has 
been the case in Palestine, where the indigenous Arab population has come to share a 
national identity as the Palestinian people, even though it has never been governed by an 
independent Palestinian government. In fact, the absence of a state has become a defining 
feature of Palestinian nationalism. This reality has been attributed to the failures of the 
Palestinian leadership, the policies of the Israeli government, and the general inability of 
the two sides to arrive at a comprehensive peace agreement in the years since the Six Day 
War. These are certainly important considerations, but the history of the Palestinian 
national movement before 1967 is also relevant for understanding the challenges facing 
the Palestinian people today. 
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The general history of the Palestine mandate (1920-1948) focuses on a main 
narrative of mutual enmity between Arabs and Jews and the ultimate futility of British 
efforts to create a peaceful coexistence for the two peoples. The basic recounting of 
events is fascinating because there is nothing in world history that is in any way 
comparable. It is the story of two developing national movements competing for control 
of one space, one of them living perennially on the land, the other trying to reestablish 
ties with its ancient homeland.  
Much of the historiography characterizes the Arab leadership as factionalized, 
unwelcoming towards Jewish settlers and uncooperative with the British authorities. This 
description is generally accurate. By 1939 the Arab situation in Palestine had deteriorated 
substantially. In that year, the MacDonald White Paper proposed a final settlement 
consisting essentially of a five year window for Jewish immigration with limits on the 
number of annual admissions, and an Arab veto on subsequent immigration. It also called 
for an independent binational state in Palestine within ten years, in which, given the 
immigration quotas, the Arabs would certainly be the majority.2 The prospect of majority 
status in an independent state, and clear and finite limits on immigration were 
unprecedented British concessions. The Arab leadership rejected the proposal, 
demanding independence and an end to Jewish immigration. The Arab leaders’ refusal to 
work within the framework of the mandate from its inception through 1939, and indeed 
to 1948, leads to the logical conclusion that there was a degree of continuity in the Arabs’ 
unwillingness to compromise.  
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However, the general consistency of the Arab negotiating line did not represent an 
unchanging Arab society in Palestine. There were a series of social and economic 
changes that increased the volatility of the situation facing the Palestinian national 
leadership. These changes both increased the urgency for a political solution and 
underscored the true cost of the failure to achieve one. In addition to social and economic 
changes, there were varying notions of national identity and shifting political possibilities 
for the future of Palestine and its Arab population. It was not simply a matter of aligning 
the political and national unit; there were also disagreements over which political and 
national units were being addressed.  
This thesis does not contradict the argument that the Palestinian Arab leaders 
mismanaged the situation, wasted time by fighting amongst themselves, and failed to act 
in a concerted and effective manner. Nor does it ignore the fact that the mandate was 
heavily biased towards Zionism, in theory and in practice. Instead, it will attempt to add 
context to the prevailing narrative by examining the relationship between the 
socioeconomic changes in Palestinian society and the political challenges that the 
Palestinian national movement was facing. The national leaders’ response to the 
challenges was closely linked to the effects these changes had on the Arab population. It 
is well-established that the Arab leadership struggled to achieve its goals during the 
mandate. Analyzing the relationship between the political challenges and the 
socioeconomic changes helps us understand why this was the case.    
The first chapter gives an overview of the political, social and economic systems 
that evolved in Palestine during the latter decades of the Ottoman Empire. It also looks at 




accepted Palestinian national identity and society was still largely dominated by family, 
village and clan loyalties. Among the political elite, there was much support for an Arab 
government, but considerable ambivalence over whether Palestine should be included in 
an independent Arab state based in Damascus or administered as its own territory under 
British rule.  
The second chapter examines the ways in which the Arab leadership consolidated 
its power in the first decade of the mandate. The Arab leaders were mostly from the 
a‘yan, the same leaders that had controlled Ottoman Palestine. Lacking an official 
channel to the British authorities, they vied for power through the Arab Executive and the 
Supreme Muslim Council. The third chapter addresses the issues of Jewish land 
purchases and immigration and how these issues related to the changes taking place in 
Arab society. These changes included the growth of Palestinian cities, the rise of an urban 
middle class, and the worsening plight of the rural lower class.  
The final chapter analyzes how these factors converged and contributed to the 
demise of the Palestinian national leadership during the Palestinian Revolt of 1936-39. 
This section discusses the culmination of the themes addressed in the first three chapters; 
the reframing of the nationalist discourse and the increase in political options that was 
reminiscent of the post-World War I era; the implosion of the status quo and the 
institutional support that had protected the traditional elites since the beginning of the 
mandate; and the rise of the villagers who took a leading role in the rebellion and acted 
independently of the notable leadership. 
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This chapter deals with the evolution of Arab society in Palestine in the years 
before World War I and during the transition from the fall of the Ottoman Empire to the 
beginning of the British mandate. Two main groups defined Palestinian Arab society at 
this time. One was the a‘yan, the elite class of landowning notables that had dominated 
Palestine during the late Ottoman era and generally continued to do so under the 
mandate. A handful of families used their economic power and social standing to 
maintain the political leadership of and control over the Arabs of Palestine. The other was 
the fellahin, mostly tenant farmers whose economic, political, and social lives revolved 
around small villages and who were at the bottom of the political patronage networks 
controlled by the a‘yan. The fairly loose administrative standards of the Ottomans, the 
prevalence of family, clan, village and religious affiliations, and the intersecting and 
overlapping loyalties of the Arabs in Palestine, resulted in a decentralized society that 
lacked an overarching sense of national identity. Also, among the political elite, there was 
uncertainty over whether to pursue a Palestinian entity under British protection or support 
the inclusion of Palestine in a larger and hopefully independent Arab state based in Syria. 
The different options within Palestine were matched by various external forces, whose 




political preferences of its inhabitants were significantly influenced by agreements 
between European powers, and to a lesser extent, the influence of Zionist leaders and 
Arab leaders from outside of Palestine.  
 
Ottoman Rule 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, what would become mandatory 
Palestine was a largely agricultural society under the general administration of the 
Ottoman Empire. By that time social conditions in the region had deteriorated 
considerably. Bedouin tribes raided fellahin farms in attacks that were frequent and 
difficult to combat. The fellahin were often caught in inter-village feuds and confronted 
with tax-farmers, the unscrupulous tax-collecting profiteers contracted by the Ottoman 
government. The regime in Istanbul ruled over the region, though its control was shaky at 
best. It was incapable of delivering the protection that the fellahin needed to farm the land 
successfully, or even to carry on with their lives. Shaykhs, or rural (tribal) chiefs, served 
the Ottomans as local agents and sometimes as tax-farmers while providing the fellahin 
with some amount of protection.3   
In the second half of the nineteenth century Ottoman rulers came to rely less on 
village shaykhs. A new position of village leader known as the mukhtar was created, 
though this official did not supplant the shaykh as the local client of the Ottoman 
administration. Instead, this role passed to a rising class of town notables known as the 
a‘yan. The shaykhs retained much of their social importance, but the crucial political and 
economic functions became concentrated in the hands of the a‘yan. Small peasant 
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farmers and villagers “came to be dependent, not on leaders whose power extended over 
only one or several villages, but on these urban leaders, whose power reached out from 
the cities to whole networks of villages.”4  
The rise of the a‘yan was made possible by the Tanzimat reforms, an ambitious 
set of administrative laws under which Istanbul sought, with varying degrees of success, 
to bring the provinces under tighter central control. A particular objective of the Tanzimat 
reforms was to systemize land ownership and increase revenue from tax collection. 
Under the 1858 Land Law all grain-producing agricultural properties were to be formally 
registered and their owners held liable for the agricultural taxes. Many peasant small 
landholders feared that land registration would result in higher tax burdens and 
conscription in the Ottoman army. Attempts to evade registration were widespread. Some 
allowed their land to be registered under the name of a powerful local figure, ceding 
official title to the land while assuming that they were retaining cultivation rights. Others 
did not register their land at all. The Ottoman authorities often claimed rights over 
unregistered lands and sold large tracts of land to urban notables at very low prices.5 
Wealthy individuals living in nearby cities like Beirut also purchased substantial tracts of 
land. The seized and sold land was still worked by the peasants, but they were not the 
official owners of the property.  
In addition to being economically lucrative, the new situation was politically 
advantageous for the a‘yan. They controlled tax collection and had largely superseded the 
village shaykhs as the local executors of Ottoman law. The a‘yan and the families they 
represented competed with one another for key administrative posts in Palestine. 
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Although power might pass from one family to another, it mostly stayed within the elite, 
wealthy ranks of society. A‘yan gains came at the expense of the fellahin, whose success 
in avoiding Ottoman taxes would later prove costly. They had relinquished legal control 
of their property and in doing so had become sharecroppers at the mercy of either the 
local a‘yan or of non-Palestinian Arabs who owned their land.  
Some fellahin kept ownership of their land under the musha’ system, a form of 
communal land ownership in which each farmer was allotted a parcel of land which was 
redistributed periodically so that the best parcels were not monopolized. Plots were 
farmed intensively but constant redistribution tended to discourage more advanced 
cultivation methods. Musha’ holdings were generally inadequate for subsistence and 
many farmers began to take out loans in order to meet their needs. By the early twentieth 
century, perpetual indebtedness, at interest rates of anywhere from 10 to 50 percent, was 
a way of life for many musha’ farmers.6 Many forfeited their property after defaulting on 
loans. One estimate shows that by 1923 75 percent of musha’ holdings had come under 
the control of absentee landlords living outside the villages.7 Although this figure was 
compiled after the Ottoman era, it indicates the longstanding trend of land acquisition by 
absentee owners, a trend that began during the later Ottoman period.  
The fate of the fellahin varied in different regions of Palestine, but it suffices to 
say that by 1914 a large proportion of the rural population of Palestine was in a 
precarious position. They were dependent on absentee landlords, either the urban a‘yan 
or an outside proprietor. Many fellahin who still owned land were only able to do so by 
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incurring large debts. The result was a highly inequitable distribution of wealth. Small 
and middling landholders survived on credit. Farmers who cultivated land belonging to 
urban notables or other absentee landlords were secure only as long as that land was not 
sold. In general, the Ottoman reforms resulted in the consolidation of the position of the 
a‘yan, and the erosion of that of the fellahin. Migdal summarizes the key changes of the 
middle and late nineteenth century. 
Peasants increasingly found the basis of their self-subsistence and autarchic 
communities slipping from under them….the Ottoman authorities shifted the 
emphasis of their policies in Palestine. Political alliances were forged with a less 
localistic, urban-based Palestinian elite. Local councils established as part of the 
reforms came to be dominated by these urban notables. Preeminent families 
consolidated their influence, controlling critical municipal offices in the towns 
and gaining control of huge tracts of land in the countryside.8     
 
  Other critical social changes took place in the late nineteenth century. In addition 
to shifts in the balance of power among the indigenous population, there were changes in 
its social composition. Zionism had formed in late nineteenth century Europe as an 
ideology that defined the Jews as a people with legitimate national aspirations. According 
to the Basel Program adopted at the first Zionist congress in 1897, “The aim of Zionism 
is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.”9 European 
Jews began migrating to Palestine in 1881. Between 1895 and 1903, 10,000 Jews 
immigrated to Palestine. From 1903 to 1914 another 34,000 arrived, and at the start of 
World War I the Jewish population totaled roughly 60,000,10 still a small minority. The 
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Arab population at this time was almost 750,000;11 but at the very least the Zionist 
movement had established the demographic foundations of a future Jewish state.   
Zionist ambition in the region is a useful reference point for understanding the 
degree of unity in Arab society in Palestine, and the obstacles the Arab population 
experienced in its evolution toward a national movement. After the beginning of the 
mandate in 1920, the Arabs of Palestine would eventually evolve into a more cohesive 
national movement with shared interests and beliefs. Resistance to Zionist advances, 
immigration and land purchases was a major factor in the growth of this solidarity. An 
examination of the initial response to Zionism helps clarify the state of Palestinian 
nationalism in the formative stages. Essentially, it addresses the question of how and 
when the Arab population began to think of itself as a singular national entity, which is 
closely linked to the question of the existence of Palestine as a distinct territorial entity 
before World War I. 
The concept of Palestine as a contiguous and at least partly unified administrative 
entity predates World War I, Zionism, and the British mandate. Beginning in 1874, the 
district (sanjaq) of Jerusalem, including the subdistricts (qadhas) of Jerusalem, 
Bethlehem, Hebron, Beersheba, Gaza, and Jaffa, was administered directly from Istanbul, 
separate from other Ottoman territories. Earlier, though only for a short time, it had been 
part of a province named Filastin, which included Nablus, Haifa, and Galilee. Previously, 
the sanjaq of Jerusalem had been administered as part of the province (wilaya) of 
Damascus.12 Schölch notes that “beneath the fluctuating surface of administrative 
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boundaries, an image of the region’s coherency, was recognizable, at least after 1830. 
During the 1870s it took on contours that were clearer. To this extent the Mandate zone 
was no artificial, colonial creation.”13  
The idea of Palestine also had some recognition among the Arabs living in the 
region. One scholar notes that “at the end of the Ottoman period the concept of Filastin 
was already widespread among the educated Arab public, denoting either the whole of 
Palestine or the Jerusalem sanjaq alone.”14 For literate Arabs, admittedly a small 
proportion of the population, the potential problems inherent in Zionist colonization were 
discussed regularly in two Palestinian newspapers, al-Karmil, established in Haifa in 
1908, and Filastin, established in Jaffa in 1911. The latter wrote of “the Palestinian 
nation [al-umma al-filastiniyya]” and “the danger which threatens it from the Zionist 
current.”15 This denotes both the presence of a threat and the notion of a distinct 
Palestinian territory that was being threatened.  
 On the other hand, the prevalence of this worldview should not be overstated. 
Arabs in the region derived their primary identification from any number of sources. 
Muslim Arabs tended to regard themselves as part of a larger community of believers that 
transcended regional or proto-national identity. The same could be said for Christian 
Arabs and the small indigenous Jewish population. In a more immediate sense, it was 
clan, sect, village, or family connections that commanded loyalty and identification. 
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Class difference and social distance meant that the a‘yan and fellahin probably did not 
regard each other as fellow Palestinians, and the legacy of inter-village warfare provided 
no basis for unity or common cause among fellahin from different villages. 
Thus by the onset of World War I, the Arab population of Palestine had some idea 
of Palestine as a distinct entity and a much more nebulous notion of itself as a Palestinian 
people. Religion, village, and family connections all competed as sources of 
identification. Connection to the land was precarious for the fellahin. They either did not 
own the land they worked or often maintained ownership by incurring crippling debt. 
This contrasts sharply with the burgeoning Zionist movement, which was steadily 
becoming more cohesive and better-financed in its goal of creating a yishuv based on land 
acquisition and Jewish immigrant labor. 
                                                                                    
Faisal and the Palestinians 
The defeat and collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I was of course a 
major turning point in the history of the modern Middle East. Its effect on the formation 
of Palestinian national movement was no less significant. Although rule from Istanbul 
had not been especially repressive, the end of four centuries of Ottoman reign 
fundamentally changed the political paradigm of the Arab population of Palestine. In 
addition, some of the political developments in the greater Middle East during and 
immediately after the war were major influences on the direction of Palestinian national 
movement in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Most important were the British dealings in the Middle East. Various British 




Arab leaders regarding the future of Palestine. In 1915-16, the British High 
Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, exchanged a series of letters with Sharif 
Husayn of Mecca, ruler of the Hijaz. The Sharif had initially sided with the Ottomans, but 
he now sought British support for the creation of an ‘Arab state’ after the war in the event 
of an Allied victory in exchange for leading an Arab Revolt against the Turks. McMahon, 
however, was reluctant to commit to specified boundaries. In one of his letters, Husayn 
asked McMahon to promise British support for “the independence of the Arab countries” 
in the areas encompassing Greater Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula,16 although the 
text does not name the individual territories specifically. In a subsequent letter McMahon 
offered nominal acceptance of the idea, but included a series of reservations that would 
have precluded the possibility of a large Arab state, and possibly even a geographically 
contiguous one. In addition to reserving Iraq to Britain and emphasizing that Britain was 
bound to respect French interest in the region, McMahon wrote, in a famously mystifying 
sentence, that “The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to 
the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be 
purely Arab, and must on that account be excepted from the proposed delimitation.”17 
Figure 1 shows some of the cities that McMahon cited as the eastern boundary of the 
region that was to be excluded from the prospective Arab state. Given the vagueness of 
his wording, it would be difficult to draw a map that definitively marked the excepted 
territory. Although no Palestinian Arab leaders were involved in the correspondence, the  
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Figure 1. Syria and Palestine, 1915. 
by Kenneth W. Stein. Copyright © 1984 by the University of North Car
Press. Used by permission of the 
 
 










letter from McMahon left the impression that the British were considering the creation of 
an independent Arab state under Sharif Husayn. These intentions, as expressed by 
McMahon, were vague and ill-defined, and the British did little to dispel the ambiguity. 
This was significant because when the war ended these letters provided the basis for the 
idea that Palestine might be included in an Arab state.   
Moreover, it appears the British overestimated the extent of Sharif Husayn’s 
influence or name recognition outside of the Hijaz. He lacked broad support throughout 
the Middle East and his ability to foment a widespread Arab Revolt, or garner support for 
unified Arab state, was far more limited than the British realized. At least until the 
takeover of the Ottoman state by members of the Committees of Union and Progress in 
1909, the Arab provinces had generally shown themselves to be amenable to Ottoman 
rule. Although the notion of a unified Arab state based in Syria would gain some support 
after World War I, it was not based on any substantial previously existing Arab sentiment 
for unity and independence under the authority of the Sharif.  
Second, in November 1917, the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour had 
announced in a letter to Lord Rothschild, the head of the British Zionist Organization, the 
intention of the British government to support the establishment of a ‘national home for 
the Jewish people’ in Palestine. It was a nonbinding but written assurance that the Zionist 
movement badly needed in order to legitimize its goals, and would become a central tenet 
of British mandate policy. Another important development was the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement, signed in 1916 between the British and French, which outlined the countries’ 
future designs for the region and their intention to create permanent spheres of influence 




Arab forces made important contributions to the Allied cause. The Sharif’s oldest 
son Faisal assisted British General Sir Edmund Allenby in the siege of Damascus in the 
fall of 1918. Faisal’s army entered the city in the beginning of October 1918, a few weeks 
before the Ottoman government surrendered by signing the Armistice of Mudros. 
The various factors at work illustrate the new realities facing the Palestinian 
Arabs. They were suddenly faced with a host of strong outside forces that were intent on 
determining the future of Palestine. Under the Sykes-Picot agreement, Palestine was to be 
internationalized, its future the subject of future negotiations between Russia, the Allies, 
and Sharif Husayn.18 For the time being, however, it was in British hands; Allenby’s 
army had captured Jerusalem at the end of 1917. In January 1918 President Woodrow 
Wilson announced his fourteen points, one of which was self-determination. In the same 
spirit, a joint Anglo-French declaration was issued in early November 1918, stating that 
the future of the people of Syria and Mesopotamia should be based on their own wishes. 
This came only days after the Zionist Organization sponsored a parade in Jerusalem to 
commemorate the first anniversary of the Balfour Declaration.19  
Finally, there was Faisal, whom Allenby’s administration had permitted to 
establish an Arab government in Damascus under British supervision. This development 
irritated the French who had expected to control that area under the Sykes-Picot 
agreement, although they lacked the necessary troops.20 On January 3, 1919 Faisal 
concluded an agreement with Chaim Weizmann, head of the World Zionist Organization 
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(WZO), which recognized the primordial ties between the Jewish and Arab people. 
Faisal, “representing and acting on behalf of the Arab Kingdom of Hejaz” agreed that 
“the surest means of working out the consummation of their national aspirations, is 
through the closest possible collaboration in the development of the Arab State and 
Palestine.”21 The agreement included clauses aimed at furthering both Arab and Jewish 
interests. Faisal was cautious, however, adding a handwritten reservation after signing the 
document, saying that he would not abide by the agreement if any amendments were 
made.22   
At the end of 1918 and at the beginning of 1919, the Palestinian Arabs, including 
the a‘yan, were facing a new and uncertain political structure. The Ottoman regime in 
Istanbul and the legitimacy it had provided was gone. In these circumstances, one would 
think that the newly emboldened Zionist enterprise was the biggest issue for the 
Palestinian Arabs, and it is true that the Zionist movement had a vision for the future of 
Palestine that certainly posed an imminent threat to the Arab population. Yet in a strictly 
political sense, Zionism was a comparatively easy issue to confront. Opposition to the 
growing Jewish colonial presence was natural and widespread among the Arabs of 
Palestine. Handling the European powers and Faisal required more tact. Until this point, 
the political power of the a‘yan had been based on its role as intermediary between the 
fellahin and the Ottoman authorities. In general, there was no unity within the notables, 
who did not act cooperatively based on mutual class interest. Rather, notable families had 
tended their own power bases while at the same time enjoying a mutually beneficial 
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relationship with Ottoman regime. Now the a‘yan were suddenly adrift, confronted with a 
situation that required effective and unified leadership and the organized advocacy of 
Palestinian Arab interests to counter European, Zionist, and outside Arab interests.  
 A unified approach never materialized for two main reasons. First, the a‘yan 
were divided by family and clan loyalties far more than they were united by any notion of 
Palestinian nationalism. Consequently, their post-World War I political dealings were 
mostly directed towards trying to reaffirm the privileges they had enjoyed under the 
Ottoman Empire. Second, in the year and a half between the end of the war and the 
confirmation of the British mandate, the notion of an independent Palestinian Arab entity 
was not universally agreed upon. Options included unification with an independent 
Greater Syria or a limited British presence in a separate Palestinian entity. The 
complexity of the issues involved and the obstacles to effective leadership are evident in 
the political organizations that began to form at the end of 1918.  
At the close of World War I Arab political activity in Palestine centered around 
three organizations. One was the Muslim-Christian Association (al-Jam‘iyat al-
Islamiyyah al-Masihiyyah), which consisted of older urban politicians, a‘yan who had 
figured prominently in Ottoman Palestine. The MCA opposed Zionism and the idea of a 
Jewish national home. It favored Palestinian self-rule through an elected local legislature 
under the auspices of Greater Syria. The president of the Jerusalem branch, ‘Arif Pasha 
al-Dajani, hailed from one of the most influential Palestinian Muslim families.23  The 
various local chapters of the Muslim-Christian Association, “were not mass membership 
bodies but were composed of religious leaders, property owners, those who held positions 
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in the Ottoman administration, and ‘noble’ families of rural origin – in short the a‘yan 
class.”24 
In addition to the MCAs, there were two other organizations: the Arab Club (al-
Nadi al-Arabi) and the Literary Society (al-Muntada al-Adabi). These groups drew 
membership from the younger urban elite rather than the older heads of distinguished 
families.25  Both organizations advocated union with Syria and strongly rejected Zionism. 
The Arab Club was less strident in its propaganda and willing to support the British,26  
provided that the British would limit Zionist claims and support Faisal’s rule in Syria. 
The Literary Society was pro-French, probably because much of its financing came from 
France. As France positioned itself to take control of Syria in the fall of 1919, the 
Literary Society grew increasingly critical of Britain and Faisal. At the end of 1919 the 
Arab Club claimed 500 members, the Literary Society 600.27 These figures may have 
been exaggerated and included individuals who held membership in both groups. Even if 
the numbers are accurate, these organizations combined with the MCA still represented 
only a small fraction of the Palestinian Arab population. Politics was undoubtedly an elite 
domain.28  
A Palestinian Arab Congress organized by the Muslim-Christian Associations 
was held in Jerusalem in January 1919. The gathering showed some shared vision for the 
future of Palestine, but also some differences. ‘Arif al-Dajani, who presided over the 
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conference, favored an independent Palestine under British stewardship, while ‘Izzat 
Darwaza of Nablus, an Arab Club member with ties to Damascus, supported Faisal and 
the incorporation of Palestine into an Arab federation.29    
Ultimately, the Congress resolved that Palestine was “part of Arab Syria” with 
“national (qawmiyya), religious, linguistic, moral, economic, and geographic bonds,” and 
that, “this district of ours, meaning Palestine, should remain undetached from the 
independent Arab Syrian Government that is bound by Arab unity, and free from all 
foreign influence and protection.”30 Other resolutions accepted British assistance 
provided that this would “not prejudice in any way its [Palestine’s] independence and 
Arab unity.”31 French ambitions in Palestine were rejected. However, there was some 
dissent on these points. A pro-French minority filed a separate report objecting to 
criticism of France as did a pro-British faction that objected to the unification of Palestine 
and Syria.32   
These resolutions were contradictory. It would be impossible for Palestine to be 
part of an independent Syrian state free from foreign influence while simultaneously 
being under British control. Furthermore, although it was a congress of Palestinian Arabs, 
the idea of political unity with Syria and the notion of shared national origins had 
tremendous influence, and there is evidence that its strength was at least equal to that of 
Palestinian nationalism. 
                                                          
29
 Ibid., 87. 
30
 Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1988), 181-82. 
31
 Ibid., 182. 
32




A report by J.N. Camp, a British intelligence officer based in Jerusalem, estimated 
that the congress was comprised of eleven Palestinian nationalists, twelve Arab 
nationalists (pro-Syrian unification), two French sympathizers, and two more that 
tentatively favored union with Syria.33 Another analysis of the report claims that Camp 
counted twelve pro-British, twelve pan-Arabists, and two pro-French.34 The pan-Arab 
bloc united with the pro-French delegates to support Syrian unity, but suspicion of French 
ambitions in Syria led to cooperation between the pan-Arabists and the pro-
British/Palestinian nationalist faction in passing the anti-French resolution. The same 
coalition was also united in recommending British assistance for Palestine.35 For the Arab 
nationalists, support for an invitation to the British was anathema to their designs for an 
independent united Syria, but was a political maneuver to safeguard them against the 
French. These shifting alliances raise two questions. First, was there an inherent 
contradiction in the delegates who favored both British control and Palestinian 
autonomy? Could they be pro-British Palestinian nationalists? Second, what was the basis 
for unity with Syria and what did pro-Syrian delegates stand to gain from their support of 
this option?    
In the first case, those who favored British intervention were mostly the older 
established leaders of families such as ‘Arif al-Dajani, who had led the conference, and 
Isma‘il al-Husayni, who had not participated but whose family was prominent in 
Jerusalem. A separate administration in Palestine would greatly benefit the Jerusalem 
notables even if, indeed particularly if, it was run by the British, as they would be the 
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natural choice to fill administrative posts.36 This partially explains the pro-British 
leanings of the MCA that the a‘yan controlled. They were eager to preserve their position 
as the local aristocracy – the role they had played under the Ottomans - and cooperation 
with the British seemed the best way to secure this objective.37 Britain’s support for 
Zionism was not overlooked, but it was outweighed by the notables’ fear of losing their 
power to a unified Arab government in Damascus.  
It should also be noted that the notables made no attempt to include any of the 
fellahin in the formation of a new Palestinian political structure. Classifying twelve 
representatives as Palestinian nationalists is true in a general sense, but this nationalism 
was not a broadly based ideological movement; it was a means of preserving the 
autonomy of local elites. Their desire for British support combined with the separation of 
Palestine from Syria seemed to be the best strategy to maintain their positions. 
If the a‘yan were at least somewhat prepared to accept British rule, the question 
remains as to why the resolution also embraced Syria. This question itself has two 
separate parts. One concerns the ideological basis for the unity of Palestine and Syria, i.e. 
the “national (qawmiyya), religious, linguistic, moral, economic, and geographic bonds” 
stated in the first resolution. There is some truth in this statement. The indigenous 
populations of Palestine and Syria did share a number of social, linguistic, and cultural 
norms stemming from the spread of the Arabic language and the Islamic faith after the 
death of the Prophet Muhammad and the conquests in the seventh century. The two 
territories were contiguous with one another and formed the greater part of the 
geographical entity known as Greater Syria. In fact, during the Ottoman Empire many of 
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the sanjaqs in what was to be the Palestine Mandate were included in the wilaya of 
Greater Syria based in Damascus.38 Yet the existence of common cultural traits and 
historical experiences among Arab peoples across the Middle East does not give 
ideological, let alone objective, coherence to the belief - one which was gaining 
momentum in the Palestinian and Syrian political circles - that the Arab people 
constituted a natural single political community. As Hourani wrote, “That those who 
speak Arabic form a ‘nation’, and that this nation should be independent and united, are 
beliefs which only became articulate and acquired political strength during the present 
century.”39 Even if it was not intellectually sound, the growing sentiment of Arab 
nationalism was a persistent and sometimes dominant ideological current in Middle 
Eastern political thought throughout much of the twentieth century. In this instance, it is a 
useful guideline for understanding the first part of the question regarding the general 
belief systems linking Palestine to Syria.  
The other part revolves around the more immediate political issues of Palestinian 
support for incorporation into Syria. The option of Syrian unification had strong support 
at the Jerusalem Congress and this idea became even more popular between January 1919 
and July 1920. The first General Syrian Congress was held at the Arab Club in Damascus 
in July 1919. The members of the Congress presented a memorandum to the King-Crane 
Commission, which had been formed by President Wilson to determine the future of 
Palestine. It praised Wilson’s “noble principles,” requested future economic and technical 
assistance from America, with Great Britain as back-up should America refuse. The 
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memo unequivocally rejected French claims to Syria and Zionist ambitions in Palestine.  
It also praised Faisal, called for a constitutional monarchy under his auspices and asked 
that there “be no separation of the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine…from the 
Syrian country.” 40 The newspaper Suriyya al-Janubiyya (Southern Syria) began 
publication in September 1919 and became very influential. It was associated with the 
Arab Club in Jerusalem and its incisive articles championed the Arab nationalist cause 
and unification with Syria.41  
Even the pro-Palestinian Jerusalem MCA jumped on the bandwagon. Although 
the Jerusalem notables were cautious about handing over their power to Damascus, they 
nonetheless were hedging their support for British protection with reverence for Faisal, 
who, at least for the time being, was the most important political figure in the Arab 
world. On 11 March 1919 the Jerusalem MCA sent Faisal a copy of its decision a month 
earlier “to authorize Your Excellency to represent Palestine and defend it at the Peace 
Conference, within the limits of the previous resolutions and the one mentioned above”.42 
Furthermore, there was no obvious alternative to Faisal. The British military 
administration did not allow the Jerusalem Congress to publish or disseminate its 
resolutions or send a delegation to the Paris peace conference.43 
The problem was that the path to pan-Syrian unity and Arab independence ran 
through Faisal, who was a less than ideal advocate for the Palestinian cause. On the one 
hand, there was his agreement with Weizmann, although, as has been noted, this was in 
fact made null and void by the reservations that Faisal himself had expressed. 
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Nevertheless, he had not consulted any Palestinian Arab leaders in making the deal. At 
the Versailles Peace Conference in August 1919, he made no claim that Palestine was 
part of Syria and at times seemed to favor a Jewish national home in the region.44 If 
Faisal did indeed favor the idea, his vision of such a home was probably not as far 
reaching as the one which subsequently developed, and it should be noted that at their 
first meeting in June 1918, Weizmann had reassured Faisal that the Jews aimed to 
colonize Palestine under the British, without setting up a government or “encroaching on 
legitimate interests.”45  
In November 1919 a group of pro-Syrian pan-Arab supporters met in Haifa and 
formed a committee which maintained contact with the Palestine Club in Damascus.46 A 
Second Syrian Congress met on 8 March 1920 and reiterated many of the 
recommendations of the first Congress, including independence under Faisal. However, 
there were also signs that patience with Faisal was growing short when ‘Izzat Darwaza 
expressed disapproval of the former’s use of Palestine as a bargaining chip.47  
Meanwhile, the situation on the ground was becoming tense. On 27 February 
1920 Major-General Louis Bols issued a proclamation of Britain’s intent to carry out the 
Balfour declaration. In the ensuing protests, 1500 Arabs gathered in Jerusalem and 2000 
in Jaffa, with the Arab Club and Literary Society as key organizing forces. MCA 
representatives met with the British authorities to deliver petitions on behalf of the 
people.48  
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The Arab Club and the Literary Society organized celebrations to coincide with 
the annual Nabi Musa (Prophet Moses) festival that was to be held in April. Leading 
Arab figures attended the festival, including ‘Arif  al-Dajani, president of the Jerusalem 
MCA, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, mayor of Jerusalem, Ya‘qub Farraj, head of the Greek-
Orthodox community in Jerusalem and two leading members of the Arab Club in 
Damascus.49 Also in attendance was Musa Kazim’s younger cousin, al-Hajj Amin al-
Husayni. 
The Nabi Musa festival was not a tranquil affair. There were attacks on Jewish 
passers-by and storeowners, and some of the speeches given were violently opposed to 
Jewish settlement.50 Hajj Amin al-Husayni excited the crowd by holding up a picture of 
Faisal, proclaiming, “This is your King!”51 Musa Kazim al-Husayni also spoke, as did the 
editor of Suriyya al-Janubiyya, ‘Arif al-‘Arif. Correspondence between British officials 
noted that “there is evident determination on their part [the Arabs] to support their words 
with actions.”52 
The fallout from Nabi Musa was rapid. With a warrant out for his arrest, Hajj 
Amin al-Husayni fled to Transjordan and then to Damascus. ‘Arif al-‘Arif was arrested 
but also fled across the river when he was released on bail. Both men were sentenced to 
ten years in absentia. Ronald Storrs, the British governor in Jerusalem, dismissed Musa 
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Kazim al-Husayni for his role in the demonstrations53 and Suriyya al-Janubiyya was 
closed permanently by the British authorities.54  
In addition to the backlash inside Palestine, the dream of Arab independence soon 
crumbled with the inauguration of the mandates. The mandate system partitioned the 
former Ottoman provinces into semiautonomous territories to be governed by a European 
power until they were deemed fit for self-government. The system had a dual appeal. It 
allowed the victorious Allied powers, Britain and France, to retain substantial influence 
over the region, while simultaneously providing a clear orientation toward eventual 
independence. This satisfied the security concerns of the Allies while also yielding to a 
key concept of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, self-determination. Iraq and 
Palestine (with Transjordan) were awarded to the British,55 while Syria and Lebanon 
were assigned to the French. Sir Herbert Samuel became the first High Commissioner of 
Palestine on 1 July 1920, marking the shift from military to civilian government. Less 
than three weeks later Faisal’s government in Damascus fell to the French army and he 
fled the country, though he would later return to the fray, serving as the King of Iraq. 
The demise of the Southern Syria idea was both a blessing and a curse for the 
Arabs of Palestine. On the one hand, it gave the fledgling Palestinian movement a much-
needed dose of reality. Britain and France had never intended to create a large unified 
Arab state and for the Palestinian Arabs to pin their hopes on such an outcome was 
wishful thinking to say the least. Faisal probably did not grasp the scale of Zionist 
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ambitions; if he had, he would perhaps not have signed a deal with Weizmann. Still, he 
was far removed from the local leadership, and therefore ill-suited to speak on behalf of 
the Arabs of Palestine. The a‘yan of Palestine supported Faisal mostly because he was 
the main Arab representative to the Europeans, but his viability as ruler was a mirage. His 
government in Damascus had lasted less than two years and done nothing to advance the 
Palestinian cause. If the upside of Faisal’s abdication was that it relocated the advocacy 
of Palestinian Arab interests within local borders, the downside was that the local 
leadership was rife with internal division. However briefly, the possibility of union with 
Syria had provided a unifying theme for a fractured decentralized society that was still 
based almost completely on clan and family ties. In the following decade, the a‘yan 
would compete for power through new religious and political organizations in Palestine, 
while making little progress in lobbying the British government for limits on Zionist 
initiatives. 
 
Which Imagined Community? 
 Less than three years had passed between Allenby’s capture of Jerusalem and the 
beginning of the British mandate. In terms of the social hierarchy Palestine had changed 
very little. The a‘yan were still the dominant social class and the fellahin remained 
connected to the villages and land that the a‘yan controlled. For most Arabs in Palestine, 
the end of Ottoman rule had relatively little direct impact on their daily lives. Yet, there 
were also a series of changes that would drastically affect the fate of the Arab community 




The demise of the Ottoman Empire could not have been regarded as a foregone 
conclusion. In 1910, for instance, it would have been difficult to predict the Ottoman 
decision to side with the Central Powers in World War I. The empire was weak compared 
to the European powers and may have eventually disintegrated on its own, but the fact 
that it was toppled by the Allied forces with imperial ambitions created a scenario where 
the future of the Arab provinces became an item on the European agenda. The a‘yan were 
confronted with two European powers, Britain and France, which possessed the strategy 
and resources to influence the future of Palestine, and it was mostly the Allies that shaped 
the political options available to the Arab leaders in Palestine.     
If nationalism is matter of aligning political and national units, the situation in 
Palestine between late 1917 and the middle of 1920 raised the question of which political 
and national units were being considered. There was ambiguity on this point for various 
reasons. McMahon’s letters gave Sharif Husayn the impression that the British were 
seriously considering an Arab state, even though McMahon was reluctant to stipulate 
clear parameters. Allowing Faisal to establish a government in Damascus and including 
him at the Paris peace negotiations further perpetuated the hope of some kind of unified 
Arab state. These decisions, as well as nominal support for President Wilson’s idea of 
self-determination, created a political environment that encouraged Palestinian support 
for Faisal. This support was expressed in the resolutions of the two General Syrian 
Congresses, by the Arab Club and Literary Society, and to a lesser degree by the MCA.  
This is not to say that Palestinian support for the Faisal-led pan-Arab option was 
solely a product of externally imposed constraints. At this stage nationalism was still a 




territory and its Arab inhabitants as specifically Palestinian had some recognition among 
the more educated strata of society, but there was certainly no unanimity on these points. 
Both pan-Arabism and Palestinian nationalism were recent inventions and in this sense 
the Jerusalem Congress’ recognition of the “national (qawmiyya), religious, linguistic, 
moral, economic and geographic bonds” between Palestine and Syria was perfectly 
legitimate. At this juncture, an expression of pan-Arab identity may have been politically 
expedient, but the same could be said of the a‘yan support for a Palestinian entity. The 
MCA favored an independent Palestine under British stewardship. This desire to separate 
Palestine from Syria indicates that, for many of the a‘yan, accepting British rule in order 
to preserve their local power bases was an acceptable, or even preferable, alternative to 
handing over that power to Damascus, even if it meant sacrificing Arab unity and a fully 
independent state.  
To summarize, the ideas of Palestinian nationalism and pan-Arabism were two 
sources of national identity that enjoyed comparable popularity in the elite political 
circles of Palestine (i.e. the Arab Club, Literary Society, MCA) at the end of World War 
I. As sentiments that advocated particular national units, each had political correlates. For 
the ‘pan-Arabists’ there was the real, albeit ill-fated, possibility of an Arab state under 
Faisal. The ideology of Palestinian nationalism was also grounded in the political realities 
of the day; the a‘yan endorsed British rule in an effort to ensure the continuity of the elite 
position that they had held under the Ottomans. The second option ultimately prevailed 
and thus provided the political and administrative platform for the growth of the 






THE BRITISH MANDATE FOR PALESTINE 
 
The British Mandate for Palestine began in 1920 and with it a new stage in the 
formation of the Palestinian national movement. Under the mandate, Palestine was 
administered a single territory for nearly three decades. The first decade was marked by a 
constant rivalry between two Jerusalem families, the Husaynis and Nashashibis, who 
sought to consolidate their power in the new political structure. During the 1920s the 
Husaynis gained control of the Arab Executive, the leading Arab political committee, and 
the Supreme Muslim Council, the main religious organization. The Nashashibis, who 
were less socially prominent and lacked the religious prestige of the Husaynis, formed an 
opposition movement based on a coalition of Husayni enemies that resented the 
dominance of a single family. During this time the elite families tried to enhance their 
power relative to one another, and also gain or maintain favor with the British authorities. 
An Arab representative body was never established, depriving the Arab population of an 
official channel for lobbying the British. The British authorities, however, were a key 
factor in the power struggle between the leading Arab families, as favor with the British 
was in itself an important measure of power. Although generally divided and lacking in 




movement during this stage in a way that distinguished it from the situations in other 
Arab countries. 
 
The Arab Executive 
 Family rivalries surfaced almost immediately after the mandate began, 
particularly when Governor Storrs appointed Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi to replace Musa 
Kazim al-Husayni as mayor of Jerusalem. The Literary Society and the Arab Club 
devolved into little more than proxies for the Husaynis and Nashashibis. Some Husayni 
supporters from the Arab Club joined the Literary Society and began challenging the 
Nashashibi leadership. Both organizations went into decline and were defunct after 
1923.56  
 This growing schism between the families came at a time when unity was badly 
needed, as the Palestinians were already operating at a disadvantage. The text of the 
mandate reiterated British support for Zionism as set out in the Balfour Declaration, and 
numerous provisions in the document expressed support for Jewish immigration and 
settlement. There was also a stipulation for the creation of a Jewish agency to assist in the 
establishment of the national home. On the other hand, references to the Palestinian Arab 
population are vague. Like the Balfour Declaration, the mandate document contained a 
statement calling for the safeguarding of “the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine”57 but it made no direct reference to the Arabs, and there 
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was no provision for an Arab agency to match the “appropriate Jewish agency” 
prescribed in article four.58  
The Muslim Christian Association called for a new conference in December 1920. 
It was the Third Arab Congress, but it was noticeably different from the first two Syrian 
Congresses. The attendees were exclusively Palestinian and the conference was held in 
Haifa rather than Damascus. Initially known as the central committee, the Arab Executive 
(AE) was established as a nine member executive committee, consisting of seven 
Muslims and two Christians. Musa Kazim al-Husayni was elected president and ‘Arif al-
Dajani vice president. The nine members were predictably men from respected 
landowning families. The two Christian representatives were merchants.59  
The platform at Haifa had six parts: recognition of Palestine as a distinct political 
entity; a complete rejection of Zionist claims to Palestine; a declaration of loyalty to a 
Palestinian Arab entity that trumped other loyalties (religion, region, clan); a request to 
the new administration to stop Jewish purchase of state or Arab land; a halt to Jewish 
immigration; and the recognition of the AE as the representative of the Arabs vis-à-vis 
the British.60 The Haifa platform clearly acknowledges the new paradigm created by the 
mandate. Palestine was now recognized as a territory of its own and national solidarity 
was declared within its boundaries. This was a departure from the resolutions of the 
January 1919 Congress held in Jerusalem which had stressed the Syrian connection. In 
addition, representation before the British, and Jewish immigration and land purchase 
were highlighted as important national issues.   
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Palestinian Congresses were held annually from 1921-1923 with the size of the 
AE increasing each year.  The term ‘Southern Syria’ fell into disuse, and by the Sixth 
Congress in Jaffa in 1923 it was completely absent from the proceedings.61 The AE relied 
heavily on local MCA branches for its organizational needs, and for a time it had a 
reasonably functioning infrastructure with the coordination of various activities between 
local chapters and the secretary in Jerusalem. In 1923 three committees, each consisting 
of eight men, were designated for administration, economics and political affairs.62 On 
the international front, the AE sent delegations to Britain, Switzerland, Turkey, and Egypt 
to raise awareness of the Palestinian cause. In the early 1920s the Executive reported on 
its progress to the annual congresses, which gathered the regional MCA representatives.63 
In addition to local MCAs and annual congresses, Jamal al-Husayni served as secretary 
and was a third source of support for the AE. As the 1920s continued the AE found its 
base of support crumbling, and between 1924 and 1928 the MCA was beset by internal 
divisions. After the sixth congress in June 1923 no more were convened until the summer 
of 1928. Jamal’s resignation in 1927 further weakened the organization.64 
Throughout the 1920s the Arab Executive faced a predicament. It was controlled 
by the heads of Jerusalem-based families like Musa Kazim al-Husayni – a‘yan and other 
elites that had acted as local supporters of the Ottoman administration. Through the MCA 
these elites had lobbied for Palestinian autonomy under British protection while rejecting 
Zionist claims to Palestine. Under the mandate they had little autonomy, partly because 
the mandate did not designate an Arab agency similar to the Jewish agency. The Arab 
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Executive was not officially recognized by the British, although there were talks of 
incorporating the Arab leadership into the Palestine government.  
In 1922 High Commissioner Samuel made proposals for the creation of a twenty-
three member legislative body that would be composed of eleven government officials 
(the high commissioner and ten others) with the remaining ten selected by the 
government in accordance with the sectarian distribution of the population, which, at the 
time, would have meant eight Muslims, two Christians and two Jews. Both Muslims and 
Christians rejected this proposal through an AE-sponsored boycott of the elections. The 
AE protested because it would not be allowed to discuss the issue of British commitment 
to Zionism. Samuel later proposed the creation of an Arab agency whose members he 
would select, but it was rejected for the same reason; it would be responsible only for 
Arab affairs, not British-Zionist initiatives.65  
The AE made its own proposal for a legislative council in 1926, calling for a 
bicameral legislature. It would have an upper house composed of both nominated 
members and elected delegates, and a lower house elected by proportional representation. 
The lower house would have the power to introduce legislation in areas like finance and 
immigration and question mandate policy. A British counterproposal reaffirmed the 
importance of the Balfour Declaration and accepted the idea of a lower house with 
proportional representation, but only if its power was very limited.66  
For the AE, cooperation with the mandatory government was tantamount to 
recognition of the Balfour Declaration and the legitimation of Zionism. Arab leaders 
were interested in participating only if they could petition against Zionist initiatives. 
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Conversely, the British authorities could not contemplate the creation of an autonomous 
Arab legislative body, as they knew very well that Arab resentment for Zionism would be 
an impediment to Britain’s commitment to a Jewish national home.  
The best the British colonial government could do was to issue periodic 
statements which attempted to mollify Arab hostility to Zionism, and assert British 
support for limits on the extent of the Jewish national home. But these occasional 
reassurances did little to improve British-Arab relations, since Zionist leaders were 
adamant about purchasing land and increasing immigration and generally unwilling to 
accept any limits in these areas. The AE was hostile to the basic principle of Zionism, 
making any British appeasement of the Arabs virtually impossible. 
Some Arab leaders were willing to work with the British. The Nashashibi family 
and its disciples had been largely excluded from the AE, which had come increasingly 
under the control of the Husayni clan. Resentment over Husayni control of the AE 
crystallized into the formation of the Palestine Arab National Party (al-Hizb al-Watani al-
Arabi al-Filastani), in November 1923. Among the organizers were ‘Arif al-Dajani, who 
had resigned from the AE, Raghib al-Nashashibi, and his nephew Fakhri. This contingent 
of opposition (mu‘aradah) leaders aimed to upstage the AE and its Husayni loyalists 
(majlisiyyah) by presenting itself as a more moderate political group that was amenable 
to working with the British. Raghib’s position as mayor precluded his active participation 
and ‘Arif al-Dajani lost his bid for the presidency of the new party to a more extreme 
candidate.67 Although the mu‘aradah had its own internal divisions, the declining AE 
could not ignore the opposition. The National Party made significant gains in the 1927 
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municipal elections. At the seventh congress in 1928, the opposition figured prominently 
in a new and enlarged Executive of 48 members. Musa Kazim al-Husayni was president, 
but the two vice presidents, Tawfiq al-Hajj ‘Abdallah and Ya‘qub al-Farraj were loyal to 
the opposition. Of the three secretaries only Jamal al-Husayni belonged to the 
majlisiyyah.68  
The strength of the AE was limited because it was not inclusive of all factions, 
and its efficacy was limited because it had no official channel to the mandate 
government. The AE was not a success, but it was noteworthy in the history of 
Palestinian nationalism. As the first centralized Palestinian Arab political organization of 
the mandate era it had a distinctly Palestinian character, and whatever pan-Arab 
sentiment remained had very little influence on its operations. There was no British 
intervention in the politics of the AE. This was small consolation for its lack of access to 
the British government, but it meant that a natural balance of power was able to emerge 
and clarify the relative strength of the different factions. It was natural in the sense that 
the outcome of any internal power struggles was not influenced by the actions of the 
mandate government. Zionist leaders did occasionally bribe some Arabs in an attempt to 
soften the anti-Zionist position of the organization, though this had no demonstrable 
effect on the distribution of power within the AE or its rhetoric, which remained firmly 
against Zionism. Above all, its internal feuds reflected the extent to which Palestinian 
Arab society was still dominated by village, clan, or family association. This continuing 
trend would prove costly in the 1930s when the need for concerted Arab action became 
more urgent.                                                                                    
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The Supreme Muslim Council 
Although the Arab Executive was the leading political body in the 1920s and 
early 1930s, it was arguably second in importance to the Supreme Muslim Council 
(SMC), the other pillar of Husayni dominance over Palestinian Arab society during the 
mandate. The creation of the council and the rise of its leader, al-Hajj al-Amin al-
Husayni, are integral to understanding how the elites consolidated power in the 1920s and 
how the fundamental contradictions  of that power were exposed in the years leading up 
to the Palestinian Arab Revolt.  
Under Ottoman rule, the office of mufti of Jerusalem had not been particularly 
important, although the degree to which British understood this is not clear. The mufti 
was basically a religious notable from a prominent local family that was subordinate to 
the Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul. As a local religious official, he issued legal opinions 
(fatwas) and provided consultation on legal and spiritual matters.  The situation changed 
considerably with the inauguration of British rule. The epicenter of secular and religious 
authority had been Istanbul. Secular power had passed to the British, over the heads of 
the Arab Executive. The religious realm was a different matter. The British colonial 
government was clearly in no position to exercise spiritual authority over an Arab 
population which was overwhelmingly Muslim.  
When the British assumed control in Palestine, Kamil al-Husayni was mufti of 
Jerusalem, a position in which he had succeeded his father Tahir in 1908.69  Unlike his 
cousin, Musa Kazim, and his younger brother, Hajj Amin, Kamil had kept in good favor 
with the British authorities. He used the pulpit of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem to 
                                                          
69




make public appeals for calm after the Nabi Musa riots.70 Also noteworthy was his 
relatively moderate attitude toward Zionism.71 British authorities rewarded his 
cooperation by appointing him head of the Central Waqf Council and president of the 
Jerusalem Shari’a court of appeal. The former position granted him control of the 
religious finances of Palestine. The latter had been held by the qadi, or religious judge, 
but was now combined under Kamil’s control. Furthermore, the British elevated Kamil to 
the role of “Grand Mufti” (al-Mufti al-Akbar), a title that had not existed previously.72  
Kamil did not enjoy his new powers for very long. He became ill and died in 
March 1921. His death created a void where there had been a pro-British Arab leader, 
and the task of choosing a replacement fell on Herbert Samuel. The High Commissioner 
was to pick a new mufti from the three candidates who received the most votes from a 
college of electors consisting of local religious officials. One of the four candidates under 
consideration was al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who had returned to Palestine following a 
pardon from Samuel in August 1920.  
Only twenty-six at the time, Hajj Amin was already a controversial character and 
one that incorporated all the contradictions of the nascent Palestinian movement. He was 
part of a new generation, serving as president of the Arab Club and penning articles for 
Suriyya al-Janubiyya. Yet he was also the son of an old elite family; his father and 
grandfather had filled the office of mufti, and of the thirteen Jerusalem mayors since 
1864, six had been Husaynis.73 He was a native of Palestine but had rallied for union with 
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Syria. He had fought briefly with the Ottoman army before joining Faisal’s army as it 
fought with the British against the Turks. While working as a recruiting officer for Faisal 
one report described him as “very pro-British.”74 This assessment stood in stark contrast 
to his incendiary role in the 1920 Nabi Musa riots and his strong anti-Zionist sentiments.  
The appointment of a new mufti was a delicate issue for Samuel. It gave him the 
opportunity to ensure local autonomy over Muslim religious affairs, a realm in which the 
British were decidedly out of their element. Hajj Amin’s defiance and subsequent exile 
had angered the British authorities, but also had won him popular support as a symbol of 
national resistance. The High Commissioner was Jewish and a dedicated Zionist, so Hajj 
Amin’s rhetoric was a cause for concern. However, Samuel’s support for a Jewish 
national home was tempered by his desire for effective governance, his acknowledgement 
of British responsibility for the indigenous Arab population, and his desire, as much as 
possible, to act independently of Zionist pressure.75 Thus the appointment of a new mufti 
was an important issue for Samuel. In Hajj Amin, he hoped for a member of the Arab 
elite with popular credibility who, much like Kamil, would be amenable to British rule.  
On the eve of the election Samuel was convinced that Hajj Amin was the man for 
the job.  In a memorandum dated April 11, 1921, the day before the election, Samuel 
recounted his meeting with Hajj Amin. 
I saw Hajj Amin Husseini on Friday and discussed with him at considerable 
length the political situation and the question of his appointment to the office of 
grand Mufti….he declared his earnest desire to cooperate with the Government 
and his belief in the good intentions of the British Government towards the Arabs. 
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He gave assurances that the influence of his family and himself would be devoted 
to maintaining tranquility in Jerusalem and he felt sure that no disturbances need 
be feared this year.76  
Still, Hajj Amin’s candidacy faced other obstacles. He was opposed by the 
Nashashibis and the Jarallahs, another prominent Jerusalem family, and as well as by 
members of his own family who considered him ill-prepared to take on such an important 
role. This was a legitimate concern. His opponents - Musa al-Budairi, Husam al-Din 
Jarallah, Khalil al-Khalidi – were three shaykhs with far greater religious education. The 
election results came back with Hajj Amin in fourth and, for the moment, he appeared out 
of the running. The Husaynis quickly protested, claiming the election was invalid on 
technical grounds. Petitions with hundreds of signatures flooded the government offices. 
Hajj Amin’s supporters included ‘ulama, notables, and even some Christians.77 
To resolve the dilemma British authorities enlisted the help of Raghib al-
Nashashibi and ‘Ali Jarallah, a shari‘a court judge and brother of the candidate in first 
place. Together they persuaded Husam Jarallah to withdraw from the list, restoring Hajj 
Amin’s eligibility as the third of three candidates.  In May 1921 Samuel appointed Hajj 
Amin as Mufti of Jerusalem, though there was no official letter or announcement.78 Hajj 
Amin’s prestige was further enhanced when he won the presidency of the Supreme 
Muslim Council (SMC). Two representatives from Jerusalem were elected to the council, 
along with one from Acre and one from Nablus. His new authority was wide-ranging. He 
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had control over the shari‘a courts, including the appointment of court officials, of 
religious schools, orphanages and waqf funds.  
As president of the SMC, he renovated and improved libraries, mosques, schools 
and health and welfare clinics. He imported 50,000 trees for planting on waqf land.79 He 
also undertook a high-profile initiative to begin the restoration and repair of the Dome of 
the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque, a campaign that included fundraising trips to other 
Arab states.80 However, Hajj Amin’s leadership was not beneficial for all. The majority 
of funding flowed to the Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Nablus districts, while Hebron and Haifa-
Acre were neglected. Religious officials were hired or dismissed according to their 
loyalty to Hajj Amin, and family members were given preferential treatment.81  
 The Supreme Muslim Council and the Arab Executive were the two centers of 
power for the Arab elites in the 1920s and 1930s. Both were controlled by the Husaynis, 
the AE by the older Musa Kazim, the SMC by his younger cousin Hajj Amin. Both drew 
the ire of a growing opposition movement. Hajj Amin, however, had a different 
relationship to the mu‘aradah than the AE, mostly because of the difference in the 
positions of the AE and SMC relative to the British. The case of Raghib al-Nashashibi 
illustrates this point well. Nashashibi had accepted Governor Storrs’ appointment to the 
mayoralty of Jerusalem after Musa Kazim’s ouster for his role in the Nabi Musa riots. 
The new mayor was instrumental in pushing Husam Jarallah aside, a move which rescued 
Hajj Amin’s candidacy. Raghib’s cooperation had come over the protest of Hajj Amin’s 
detractors including some members of the Nashashibi family, but his compliance with the 
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Mufti’s growing power did not last. Hajj Amin was a threat to the Nashashibis because 
his power was based on a formidable combination of administrative authority, financial 
resources, and British backing. Nashashibi and five of his supporters boycotted the 1922 
SMC elections, though this move was not very effective as it resulted in an easy victory 
for the Mufti.82  
Although Hajj Amin was in a more secure position because of British support and 
his broad autonomy over religious affairs, he was not immune to the challenge from the 
mu‘aradah. The controversy surrounding the 1926 SMC elections is further evidence of 
growing discontent over Husayni dominance. The elections also indicate how continued 
British involvement in the SMC was an important influence that was absent from 
interactions between the AE and the opposition. 
The SMC constitution stipulated that elections should be held every four years, 
although it was vague about whether or not the president was elected permanently.83 In 
the ensuing race for the other four seats the results returned two opposition supporters 
and two Hajj Amin supporters; but a civil court nullified the results on technical grounds 
when both sides contested the districts where they had lost. The British authorities 
appointed two opposition members and two Husayni supporters, resulting in the same 
distribution returned by the contested results.84 Hajj Amin kept a majority on the council 
and did not have to face reelection, which was particularly critical as it gave him lifetime 
control over the most powerful position in Muslim Palestine.   
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Although the Mufti had to admit the opposition into the SMC, he was in a 
stronger position than the AE. The main reason for this was that he enjoyed British 
support for his office which, although controlling considerable finances and a vast 
network of patronage, was largely nonpolitical until 1930; and while his disdain for 
Zionism was well-known, political advocacy was left to the Arab Executive. Hajj Amin 
did not endure the public failure of the AE because in the 1920s he did not make any 
concrete attempts to lobby the British or turn his anti-Zionist views into real action. In 
fact, the main condition of his support from the British was based on his willingness to 
abstain from politics. In short, the AE had somewhat defined political goals but was 
weak, divided, and lacked standing with the British. Hajj Amin al-Husayni had British 
backing and appeared strong, but he did not yet wield his power to oppose the advance of 
Zionism through immigration and land purchase.  
The Arab Executive initially showed some organizational capability as the leading 
organization of the national movement by convening annual congresses and coordinating 
political action between the national and local levels, but its effectiveness gradually 
waned and its structure broke down as it faced mounting challenges from the opposition. 
Although it reconstituted itself by incorporating the opposition, the AE remained an elite 
organization beset by infighting and it lacked any official channels to influence British 
policy. In consolidating his power as Grand Mufti and president of the Supreme Muslim 
Council, Hajj Amin al-Husayni traded his earlier militancy for British support and wide-
ranging control over Islamic affairs in Palestine; and while he benefitted from close 
relations with the British, his pledge to refrain from politics limited the extent of his 




The mandate era is remembered today for the volatile relations between Arabs 
and Jews and the failure of the British to properly adjudicate the situation. This legacy is 
understandable given the increasing frequency of violence after 1929. Although the years 
between 1922 and 1929 were generally tranquil, they are key for understanding the 
troubles that later confronted the Arab leadership. First, Palestine was administered as its 
own mandate, and it was unique in being designated as the site of the Jewish national 
home. While this seems obvious, it should be stressed that in the few years before the 
inception of the mandate there was no unanimous support for Palestine as a specific 
political territory, or the recognition of its population as uniquely Palestinian. The 
inauguration of the mandate created the climate for the emergence of the AE and SMC as 
distinctly Palestinian organizations through which the a‘yan vied for power. After the 
disappearance of the pan-Arab option from the agenda, these developments reaffirmed 
the new reality created by the mandate: Palestine was its own political unit, no longer part 
of the Ottoman Empire and not the southern province of Syria.  
After 1920, support for unity with Syria as a national sentiment lessened mainly 
because the British mandate rendered this politically infeasible. In much the same way, 
the strength of the Palestinian national movement was also influenced by the political 
developments that unfolded in the early years of the mandate.  The inception of the 
mandate was a political development which encouraged the rise of the AE as a national 
institution. This process also worked in reverse; the lack of political development brought 
about the decline of national organizations. The AE was weakened by 1927, as were the 
MCA chapters that it relied upon heavily. This was a consequence of disagreement within 




significant accomplishments to sustain its morale. As the leading organization of the 
fledgling national movement, it was crippled by the failure to gain official access to the 
British authorities.  
Thus the national movement was already at an impasse in the late 1920s. The 
mandate had created a territorial entity as the platform for the growth of the Palestinian 
national movement, but none of the political tools necessary for the fulfillment of 
national aspirations. The text of the mandate was vague in its references to the Arab 
population and completely silent on the issues of an Arab agency or legislative council. 
With the failure to come to terms on an Arab representative body and the lack of political 
progress that followed, the Arab leaders were left to fight amongst each another.  
In addition to the decline of pan-Arabism and political stagnation on the British 
front, there were other factors that either created disincentives for cooperation or at least 
hindered it. One was the widespread persistence of class, village, and family divisions 
through Palestinian Arab society and the generally submissive attitude of the lower 
classes. For the a‘yan there was not yet much pressure from below for unity or political 
progress. The national movement also lost a major motivating factor with the temporary 
reduction in the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine. Immigration had receded to 
negligible levels by 1928 and with it the perceived threat of Zionism seemed to decrease. 
Neither of these trends would hold. The next chapter will analyze how Jewish 
immigration and land purchase both coincided with and catalyzed socioeconomic 
changes. These changes politicized new segments of the Arab population and tested the 







Most of the political and national developments analyzed so far have been 
concerned with the dealings of the a‘yan and the organizations that they controlled. The 
activity of the political and social elite is definitely important for understanding the early 
history of the Palestinian national movement and the nature of the obstacles facing the 
movement. The a‘yan had served the Ottomans well as a local ‘service aristocracy’, and 
during the first decade of the mandate they maintained their leadership over the Arab 
population while presiding over a period which was generally peaceful, though not 
without tensions. The sources of these tensions, which would manifest themselves in the 
early 1930s, relate to two trends already evident in Ottoman Palestine: Arab uneasiness 
over Jewish immigration and the precarious economic situation of the fellahin.  
Arab opposition to Zionism increased substantially in the early twentieth century 
and was further bolstered by the announcement of the Balfour Declaration in 1917. Also, 
many fellahin had become tenant farmers during the era of the Tanzimat reforms. They 
had ceded title to the a‘yan, or to wealthy Arabs living outside of Palestine, to avoid 
Ottoman registration and tax liability. During the mandate these two aspects intersected 
when large numbers of fellahin were evicted after Jewish buyers purchased the plots 




center of a series of socioeconomic changes which altered Palestinian culture. Many of 
the old cultural traits of the Ottoman era – decentralization, a traditional economy, and 
rigid social hierarchy – were largely, though not entirely, superseded by more dynamic 
patterns of social interaction and economic diversification. The position of the traditional 
Arab leadership was not immediately threatened, but these social changes meant that 
their inability to win concessions from the British was beginning to have wider 
ramifications.        
 
The Western Wall Riots 
In the summer of 1929 violence broke out at the Western (Wailing) Wall in 
Jerusalem, a place of deep religious importance to both Jews and Muslims. It was the 
only remaining portion of an outer wall that had once surrounded Herod’s temple. The 
temple had been destroyed by the Romans in 70 CE and was one of the most important 
Jewish holy sites. To Muslims, the Wall was below the Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest 
site of Islam, where the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock had been built. 
Muslims believe that the Prophet tethered his horse to the wall before ascending to 
heaven from the Dome of the Rock.85 A disagreement over worship practices that had 
begun a year earlier turned into Arab-Jewish riots resulting in the death of 133 Jews and 
116 Arabs. The British authorities established a commission headed by Sir Walter Shaw 
to investigate the immediate causes of the violence. The Shaw Commission did not 
confine itself to the details of the riots; it also made sweeping observations about the 
nature of the problems of mandatory Palestine and the issues confronting the Arab 
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population. Issued in 1931, the report stated that the main cause of Arab attacks was, “the 
Arab feelings of animosity and hostility to the Jews consequent upon the disappointment 
of their political and national aspirations and fear for their economic future.”86 The report 
noted the presence of “landless and discontented” groups of Arabs that were growing as a 
result of the yishuv. It cited Jewish immigration and land purchases as the sources of 
Arab discontent and recommended closer British regulation in these areas.87 
The fear of immigration on the part of the Arab population reflected its uneasiness 
over the real changes that had taken place in the demography of Palestine. An Ottoman 
census taken in 1914 had placed the total population of Palestine at 689, 272 with a 
Jewish population of about 60,000.88 The British also conducted a census in 1922 that 
recorded 757,000 inhabitants, 89 percent Arab (i.e., Christian and Muslim) and 11 
percent Jewish.89 The Jewish population was predominantly urban: almost three-quarters 
of the 83,794 Jews lived in the urban areas in or around Jerusalem, Jaffa and Tel Aviv.90 
About 20,000 Jews resided in the north, including 6,000 in Haifa.91 Conversely, the Arab 
population was predominantly rural. Seventy-one percent of Arabs were classified as 
rural in 1922.92 This trend held steady into the mid-1930s with a only a quarter living in 
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towns, compared to the Jewish population which, by that time, was still only a quarter 
rural.93  
It is interesting that the Shaw Report cited Jewish immigration as a major source 
of Arab discontent, because by that time Jewish immigration had begun to stagnate. 
Between 1919 and 1923 annual immigration did not exceed 9,000. This figure soared to 
34,386 in 1924 before plummeting to 3,000 in 1927 when the number of departures 
actually exceeded the number of arrivals. Annual immigration remained below 5,000 
through 1931.94 If immigration was a main source of Arab discontent, as the Shaw Report 
contends, it raises the question of just how the immigration issue was affecting Arab 
society and politics, particularly when relatively few Jews were entering Palestine, and 
the ones that did settled in cities far away from the mostly rural Arab population. This is 
best answered with an examination of another observation of the report – the issue of 
Jewish land acquisition and the rise of a “landless and discontented” Arab class.   
 
The Land Issue 
From the outset, the importance of land ownership in understanding the Arab-
Israeli conflict is obvious. Jews and Arabs had competing visions of the future of 
Palestine. For the Zionists, control of the physical space meant credibility for their claim 
that the land was rightfully theirs, and created “facts on the ground” and a legally 
recognized reality of the Jewish presence which bolstered that claim. Like Jewish 
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immigration, land purchase had already begun before the start of the mandate. According 
to one estimate, Jews had purchased 650,000 dunams of land before 1920.95 The two 
issues were also similar in their uneven distribution in the first decade of the mandate. In 
1921 Jewish land purchase totaled 90,785 dunams; two years later it was only 17,493 
dunams. In 1925 the figure rose to an unprecedented 176,124 dunams before falling to 
less than 20,000 in 1927, and rising again to 65,000 in 1929.96 By the end of the mandate 
in 1947 Jews had purchased 1.73 million dunams, amounting to roughly 24 percent of all 
cultivable land or 7 percent of the total land area. A survey in 1931 listed the total land 
area of Palestine as 26.6 million dunams. The amount considered cultivable was around 8 
million, though this was the subject of some dispute.97  
These statistics do not really convey the centrality of the land issue in the 
evolution of the Palestinian national movement and how it contributed to changes in the 
social composition of the Arab population. The specific circumstances of the land sales 
and the ways in which these circumstances changed over the first fifteen years of the 
mandate are crucial for understanding the struggle that transformed the political climate 
of Arab society in Palestine. One issue is why Palestinians would willingly sell their 
lands to Jews. In reality, before the 1930s the majority of land sales were made by non-
resident Arabs who, as noted earlier, had purchased substantial amounts of land in 
Palestine during the late Ottoman era. During the long drought of the 1920s, inefficiency 
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and lack of investment capital turned large landholdings into something of a liability. 
Groups like the Jewish National Fund and the Palestine Land Development Company 
could offer far more than the land was really worth and absentee landowners were eager 
to take advantage.98  
In the 1920s and early 1930s, the vast majority of Jewish land purchases resulted 
from the sales by “several hundred” Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arabs who owned 
large parcels.99 For example, the Sursuq family of Beirut was the main seller of large 
tracts of land in the Jezreel Valley. The sales, which occurred from 1921-25 and totaled 
roughly 240,000 dunams, were to the Jewish National Fund and American Zion 
Commonwealth.100 The former was a successful outfit, purchasing 270,084 dunams by 
the end of 1930, 90 percent of which came from absentee landowners.101 Though most 
transactions involved less land, sales between absentee landlords and Jewish land 
agencies were typical. The best available data on land purchases covers just over half of 
all Jewish land purchases up to 1936. In the years preceding the riots at the Western Wall 
a trend is clear. Between 1920 and 1927 82 percent of Jewish land purchases were from 
absentee landlords.102 Between 1923 and 1927 large non-Palestinian landowners 
accounted for 86 percent of all sales; 12.4 percent of sales were from large Palestinian 
landowners, and 1.6 percent were from the fellahin.103 Also, between the 1880s and the 
late 1930s most sales were not in densely populated regions and Jewish-Arab clashes 
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resulting from peasant evictions, though not unheard of, were rare and generally “devoid 
of any political character.”104 The Zionists wanted to buy large, contiguous strips of land, 
with few inhabitants and no tenants. In this sense, working with absentee landlords was 
the best possible scenario and one that had seemed to work without inciting the Arab 
population before the 1929 riots. 
The Shaw Report was both diagnostic and prophetic. It is true that the problems 
over land sales concerned Arabs during the 1920s. Yet few Palestinian Arabs were 
involved in or affected by Jewish land purchases compared to the seven years between 
1930 and 1936. After 1929 the seriousness of the land issue deepened in three ways. 
First, Palestinians replaced the other Arabs as the primary sellers of land. Second, 
considerably more Palestinians were dispossessed as a result of land sales. This 
dispossession was the catalyst for a larger transformation in which unprecedented 
numbers of Palestinians took part in new forms of political participation, social 
interaction, and economic diversification. Finally, the land issue exposed the inability of 
the Arab leadership to mitigate public frustration effectively or to redress popular 
grievances with the British authorities.   
Beginning in the late 1920s the percentage of sellers living inside Palestine rose 
swiftly. The data available from 1928-1932 and 1933-1936 reflect the changing 
distribution of sellers. Large non-Palestinian landowners accounted for 45.5 percent of 
sales in the first period and a mere 14.9 percent in the second, a significant drop from the 
86 percent of 1923-1927. Large Palestinian landholders had been only 12.4 percent of 
sellers in the mid-1920s. Their share rose to 36.2 percent in the following four years and 
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then to 62.7 percent in the mid-1930s. The share of the fellahin also rose, from 1.6 
percent to 18.3 percent to 22.5 percent, indicating the Zionist purchasers’ willingness to 
buy much smaller plots of land.105  
The statistics are valuable for gaining an understanding of the history of Jewish 
land purchase, but they provide no explanation of why Palestinian landholders, large and 
small, would sell their land to Jewish immigrants whose presence they resented. Here it is 
useful to recall the land situation in Palestine in the late Ottoman era. The concentration 
of land in the hands of non-Palestinian Arabs or urban a‘yan meant that most of those 
living on the land and in villages had no legal to right to the land on which they worked. 
Just as it had for the large non-Palestinian landholders, the entry of Jewish land 
purchasing organizations into the equation was an enticing prospect for the a‘yan, most 
of whom were urban-dwelling absentee landlords. With the benefit of wealthy European 
backers Jewish interests were willing to pay more than the going market price. These 
sales meant that Palestinians who had worked the land for generations were evicted from 
the land and uprooted from their traditional homes. Sales by large landholders were 
devastating to the tenant farmers that had relied on the land for generations.  
The fate of the small farmers who actually owned their plots was another matter. 
Large landowners often engaged in land speculation as a profitable business move and to 
maintain their standing relative to other a‘yan. For small “owner-occupiers,” the decision 
to sell was a matter of survival rather than profit. The fellahin, musha’ shareholders and 
other owner-occupiers were crippled with debt incurred largely because of exorbitant 
interest rates. According to one source, by 1930 “30 percent of all Palestinian villagers 
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were totally landless, while as many as 75 to 80 percent held insufficient land to meet 
their subsistence needs.”106 Many small to medium size landholders sold off all or part of 
their plots to pay debts.107 The problem of debt was further compounded by a bleak 
agricultural economy and unfavorable tax policy. In 1928 new land taxes were introduced 
based on the crop prices of 1923-24, even though prices had dropped considerably since 
then.108 To make matters worse, there were a series of bad harvests from 1931-1934. The 
price of wheat fell from ₤P10.81/ton in 1929 to ₤P6.97/ton in 1931. Barley fell from 
₤P7.66/ton to ₤P3.03/ton.109  In 1930 the government of Palestine investigated 21,000 
fellah families in 104 villages, approximately 26 percent of the farming community. The 
investigation found that the average debt of a fellah family was ₤P27 pounds at an annual 
interest rate of 30 percent. Average yearly income was only ₤P25-30 pounds.110  
Some fellahin living along the coastal plain near Jaffa or Haifa sold part of their 
land and converted their remaining holdings from vegetable or cereal production to citrus 
crops. In the 1920s and 1930s Jews and Arabs looked to a rapidly growing citrus industry 
to turn a profit. For the Arabs, selling part of their land provided the necessary capital for 
start-up costs like irrigation systems. The amount of land area devoted to Arab citrus 
groves grew more than fivefold between 1922 and 1935.111 But there was little hope of 
economic salvation in citriculture, as rapid expansion led to overproduction. Exports rose 
from 2.4 million cases in 1930-31 to 13 million in 1938-39 while prices reportedly fell by 
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half.112 Arab growers also faced competition from Jewish planters who had access to 
more capital and advanced technology. Stein notes the impact of these changes on 
Palestinian society. 
For at least the first decade of the Mandate, most of the large landowners were 
able to retain considerable socioeconomic influence over the fellaheen classes. 
Gradually, the ties between the fellaheen and the landlord-merchant-creditor 
were reduced. As land slowly came into Jewish ownership and occupation 
during the Mandate, Palestinian Arab social relationships were altered to the 
detriment of Palestinian Arab unanimity.113   
 
Indeed, the increasing scope of land transfer significantly altered the social 
structure of the Arab community in Palestine. The newly landless Arabs, who by one 
estimate already amounted to 30 percent of all Arab villagers in 1930, were a catalyst for 
the changing power structure. The failure of the traditional economy meant that peasants 
were experiencing greater ‘freedom’ from the social network of the village and the 
political hierarchy that reinforced the power of the urban notables. Landless Arabs and 
those whose holdings were insufficient for their own subsistence began to seek new work 
opportunities in the growing urban centers. Urbanization and in-migration meant that the 
lower classes became part of more dynamic social patterns. This may have been to the 
detriment of unity, but that unity was based on a stagnant a‘yan-fellahin relationship that 
could no longer provide security. As the mandate continued and the economic situation 
worsened, the influence of the notables began to wane. A British official observed that by 
1927, two years before the Western Wall riots, the notables appeared apprehensive over 
the peasantry’s “growing tendency to distinguish between national and Effendi [notable] 
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class interests.”114 The notables had reason to be nervous. The rural to urban migration of 
the lower classes was like shifting sand beneath their feet. 
 
Arab Society in Transition 
The two main characteristics of the Arab social transformation in Palestine were 
urbanization and increasing wage labor. Between 1922 and 1931 the Arab population of 
Haifa grew by 87 percent, and Jaffa’s Arab population increased by 63 percent over the 
same span.115 Urbanization was not limited to the western coastal region, although 
population growth in those cities outpaced that of the areas to the east. Jerusalem’s Arab 
population grew by 37 percent in the decade before 1931, and Ramleh and Lydda grew 
by 43 percent and 39 percent, respectively.116 Thus some of the fastest Arab population 
growth was in the areas with the least a‘yan influence. Many urban migrants found work 
on Jewish citrus plantations, in construction, and to a lesser extent in industrial 
employment. One major source of employment was the public works projects initiated by 
the British administration.  
Their entrance into the city brought the landless Arab class into contact with a 
variety of new influences. One was the predominantly Christian urban middle class of 
lawyers, teachers, civil servants, and artisans. A Muslim professional middle class also 
began to emerge in the 1920s and would eventually challenge the notables. Many were 
educated and sought advancement through careers in government or commerce. Aside 
                                                          
114
 Report from Colonel Symes, governor of the Northern District to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
Nels Johnson, Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism (London ; Boston: Kegan Paul 
International, 1982), 37. 
115
 Rachelle Taqqu, "Peasants into Workmen: Internal Labor Migration and the Arab Village Community 
under the Mandate," in Palestinian Society and Politics, ed. Joel S. Midgal (Princeton, New Jersey: 






from its disdain for the growing Jewish presence, this group harbored some resentment 
toward the Muslim elite as well as the Christian Arabs. This class would begin “to 
comprise an important independent political influence in the 1930s”.117  
The growth of the Christian and Muslim middle classes indicated some advances 
in key areas like education and the economy. There was a noticeable increase in the 
manufacture of consumer goods. Between 1921 and 1935 the number of firms using 
power-driven machinery rose from seven to 313.118 New opportunities were created in 
areas like “education, medicine, law, white-collar government employment, and 
journalism.”119 In the realm of education the number of Christian schools rose from 58 to 
99 between 1928 and 1936, with overall enrollment more than doubling during that time. 
During the same era, the number of Muslim-operated schools jumped from 75 to 175 and 
enrollment more than tripled.120  
The migration of landless Arabs to the burgeoning Palestinian cities had a 
significant impact both on the newly arrived and on the cities they entered. The newly 
urbanized fellahin were introduced to forms of interaction that had been rare or 
nonexistent in their former lives. In Haifa for example, the Palestine Arab Workers 
Society was organized in 1925. This was the first Western-style labor organization, 
though it lacked the funding and organization needed to be effective. In addition, town 
cafés served as venues where Arab newspapers were read aloud, and, somewhat later, 
where news could be heard on the radio. Also, poetry was reprinted in newspapers or 
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recited in public.121 Since most of the fellahin who had come to the cities were illiterate, 
public recitals were an important channel for news and commentary on the Arab 
situation.  
The cities and towns were centers of the growing Palestinian nationalist class, 
where Arabs, Muslim and Christian, were more likely to be educated, literate and 
professional. In other words, they were more likely to possess the means of expressing 
Arab grievances regarding British policy, articulating resentment toward Zionism, and 
formulating alternatives to the entrenched urban elites like the Nashashibis and Husaynis, 
which, as we will see, were gradually losing their monopoly over Palestinian Arab 
politics. The elite decline was inseparable from the socioeconomic changes taking place.     
Yet at the same time, the city did not adequately replace the village as an 
economic, political and social provider for the lower classes. Although urban migrants 
had greater freedom than before, they never assimilated fully into the wage labor work 
force or urban life. Life in the cities was tough. In Jaffa and Haifa many fellahin lived in 
shacks on the outskirts of town and the established urbanites generally kept the 
newcomers at a distance. Skilled and professional urban Arabs could earn much higher 
wages than the migrants who struggled to find work as day laborers.122 Work in cities 
was sporadic. Jewish businesses preferred to hire Jews and when Arabs could find work 
in such businesses it was low-paying and temporary. For the migrants, their links to the 
capitalist economy meant enduring risk and uncertainty. There was the prospect, but not 
the promise, of prosperity. In fact, many urban migrants maintained ties to their villages 
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because their wages were insufficient to sustain them. In some cases wage labor was 
organized through existing village structures. For public works projects the British 
authorities often contracted workers from nearby villages, using the village mukhtar as 
the recruiter.123 On a broader level, Arab society retained its rural character well into the 
mid-1930s with three-quarters of the population living on the land and 62 percent still 
working in agriculture.124 Though many of those counted as rural dwellers and farm 
workers periodically lived and worked in cities and towns, it is clear that many kept their 
connections to the land.  
Nevertheless, the experience of the Palestinian villagers who found part-time or 
seasonal work in cities and towns was integral to the formation of a broader Palestinian 
national consciousness. The entry of peasants into a wage labor system weakened the 
elite patronage networks that operated in the villages. Interaction with the urban middle 
class was important because it gave peasants contact with another class that shared 
similar resentments over the activities of the traditional elite, which was either profiting 
financially from land sales or failing politically through its inept advocacy of Arab 
grievances. Also, the rural to urban path of the displaced villagers gave them a unique 
first-hand experience of the two main issues cited by the Shaw Report - land purchase 
and immigration. Many had been evicted as a result of land sales to Jews and as migrant 
workers they often competed with the predominantly urban Jewish immigrant population. 
It is true that the Arab and Jewish economies were largely separate. Jewish firms were 
discouraged from hiring Arabs for the sake of solidarity and in the interest of a self-








sufficient economy.125 But Arabs were given limited opportunities in the Jewish sector, 
enough so that resentment over failed expectations was aimed at the Jewish immigrants 
who did receive those jobs, or were paid more for the same work; and it constituted an 
experience to which the urban notables and the more secure urban middle class could not 
as easily relate.  
The economic plight of the Palestinians and the social shifts in Palestinian society 
did not by themselves generate opposition to, or dissatisfaction with, the Husaynis, the 
Nashashibis, or the other urban notables. It was the political fallout of the 1929 riots that 
helped to aggravate the growing schisms in Palestinian politics. A second commission 
headed by Sir John Hope-Simpson found that exclusionary Jewish labor practices and 
land policies were contributing to the landless Arab problem, as well as violating the 
clause in Article 6 of the mandate which stipulated that the “rights and position of the 
other sections of the population” should not be prejudiced.126 The Colonial Secretary, 
Lord Passfield, issued a new White Paper based on Hope-Simpson’s findings, calling for 
restrictions on Jewish land purchase and immigration. After fierce objections from 
Zionists in London and Palestine in 1931, Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald wrote a 
letter to Chaim Weizmann, who had resigned in protest from his position as head of the 
World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency. MacDonald reassured Weizmann 
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that the British government was not considering prohibiting land purchase or stopping 
immigration.127  
The Arab Executive had sent delegates to London in 1930, the first delegation 
since 1923. MacDonald’s repudiation of the Passfield White Paper and the findings of the 
two commissions were important events for Palestinian Arab politics and for the 
subsequent history of the Palestine mandate. The “black letter”, as it became known, 
humiliated the AE and made it look weak in the eyes of the Arab public. It also 
galvanized a new type of political activism separate from that of the elites. This activism 
reflected resentment not only against Zionism, but against the Arab elites and the British 
authorities as well. 
 The socioeconomic changes of the 1920s and 1930s and the political aftermath of 
the Wailing Wall riots revealed the underlying vulnerabilities in the rule of the notables. 
Before discussing the specific political groups and activists that emerged in the early 
1930s, it is important to understand some of the sources of the a‘yan weakness.   
The mandate had delineated a political territory that served as a backdrop for the 
growth of the Palestinian national movement. The uniform legal, bureaucratic, and 
administrative system instituted by the British did not eschew all notions of pan-Arabism, 
but the everyday issues facing the Palestinian Arabs inevitably revolved around issues 
specific to Palestine. For the traditional leadership, the mandate meant a rise in the 
importance of Jerusalem. Many of the a‘yan were holdovers from the latter days of the 
Ottoman Empire. (The Mufti himself was younger, but the Husayni family name was 
synonymous with the establishment.) But unlike in Ottoman times Jerusalem was not 
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subordinate to Istanbul. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the fall of Faisal’s 
government in Damascus had left the Jerusalem families as the de facto leaders of the 
Arab community in Palestine. Although not popularly elected, the a‘yan were generally 
accepted by the Arab population as its natural leaders, since liberal notions of democracy 
and equality were not widely held in Arab Palestine. This was reinforced by the British 
policy of dealing primarily with the notables and respecting the traditional hierarchy.  
 For these reasons the position of the a‘yan was not subject to direct and 
immediate challenges from either the British or the nonelite sectors of Arab society. But 
the Arab leaders were in a tenuous position, in that they had to maintain a somewhat civil 
relationship with both groups in order to preserve their own power. The leaders’ 
relationship with the mandate government could be uncooperative, as it generally was, 
but almost never violent or confrontational. The Arab leaders could not incite the 
population or openly defy mandate policy without risking a backlash from the British 
authorities. They had learned this much after the Nabi Musa riots. Conversely, the British 
could not forcefully win Arab support for the terms of the mandate (i.e., the Jewish 
national home). In the absence of any agreement on a legislative council, a tacit 
acceptance of noncooperation developed between the two sides. The Arab leadership was 
not complaisant or accepting of Zionism, nor was the mandate government blind to Arab 
concerns. It was simply that the two sides were too far apart on key issues. The Arab 
leadership did not want to acquiesce with a formal acceptance of Zionism, while the 
mandate government remained committed to the creation of a Jewish national home and, 
as the MacDonald letter demonstrated, Zionist leaders in London and Palestine were very 




The relationship between the Arab leaders and the Arab public was more 
complex. The mandate government and its positions were a well-known variable; its 
policies were promulgated by law, processed through bureaucracies, and carried out 
through official channels. This does not mean that British officials within the government 
always agreed on how to proceed, but they generally adhered to the official position. The 
Arab public differed in that it did not address its leaders as one voice, but increasingly as 
a plurality of voices. By 1931 the Arab population in Palestine had climbed to over 
850,000. In addition to being much larger than it was in 1917, it was considerably more 
dynamic. The power structure that anchored the position of the Arab leadership was still 
largely based on the traditional hierarchy that had accompanied the rise of the a‘yan in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century. Jewish land purchases had played a major role in 
exposing the inherent problems in the decades-old system for land ownership, and had 
given rise to considerable Arab landlessness. This situation contributed to greater social 
diversification, and very often, to economic deterioration. These developments in turn 
created a sense of urgency to stem the tide of Jewish land purchases and immigration, and 
because the Arab leadership was incapable of doing so, there was now an opening for 
newer and more radical political groups. The emergence of such groups indicated that 
Arab politics was evolving in response to the economic and social changes in Arab 
society, and that the political role of the Palestinian leadership as the main voice of the 








NEW VOICES, OLD PROBLEMS 
 
The 1930s was a pivotal decade in the history of the Palestinian national 
movement. As the leaders of the movement, members of the traditional elite found 
themselves in a difficult position. The Arab public beneath them was changing. The 
Zionist initiatives – Jewish immigration and land purchase – were gaining momentum 
and creating unrest, particularly among the lower classes. Until this point politics had 
been controlled by the a‘yan, particularly notable families from Jerusalem like the 
Husaynis and Nashashibis. In this decade the leadership was confronted with new 
political groups that often advocated direct, and sometimes violent, confrontation with 
British officials. The traditional leaders remained entangled in their own feuds at a time 
when they could least afford to be. They were caught between a restive Arab public, new 
radical voices, increasing Jewish immigration and land purchases, and a generally 
unsympathetic mandate administration. The situation worsened when it was publicized 
that some members of the AE were complicit in land sales, either as sellers or as brokers. 
This and other forms of collaboration with Zionists heightened the internal divisions in 
Arab society. The Arab Revolt of 1936-39 was a direct outcome of these factors and the 
result of an untenable political situation. Political problems were compounded by 




command. The national leaders were powerless to stop the violence, and in an attempt to 
help their situation they looked to outside Arab leaders to help remedy the situation. 
Other Arabs took an active part in supporting the Arab Revolt in Palestine, and their 
leaders became intermediaries between the Palestinians and the British. Ultimately, the 
inherent weaknesses of the traditional Palestinian leadership resulted in their losing 
control of the national movement. Political leadership of the Palestinian cause passed to 
outside Arab leaders who were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, but without a vital 
stake in Palestine.      
 
Challenge and Response 
An array of new organizations had emerged by the early 1930s. The Young Men’s 
Muslim Association had already been established in the late 1920s. The Arab Young 
Men’s Association (Jam‘iyyat al-Shubban al-‘Arab) was formed in the early 1930s and 
attacked the failure of notable leadership.128 In January 1932 the first National Congress 
of Arab Youth met in Jaffa. Like other new groups, it acted as a radical influence on the 
AE. Specifically, it was the driving force behind the decision of the AE to stage protests 
in Jerusalem in 1933. It also organized the Arab Boy Scouts of Palestine in 1934. 
Through its branches the Boy Scouts imbued the Arab youth with nationalist ideals and 
encouraged shopkeepers and merchants to participate in strikes.129  
Earlier, in July 1931, the Nablus MCA showed its growing radicalism by 
renaming itself the Patriotic Arab Association (al-Jam‘iyyah al-‘Arabiyyah al-
Wataniyyah) and convening a conference in Nablus that was attended by three hundred 
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young radicals. The congress elected an executive committee of non-Jerusalemites and 
demanded a stronger anti-British stance on the part of the AE.130 There were also calls to 
establish a defense organization and acquire weapons, as well as accusations against 
prominent Arab leaders for their complicity in the land sales to Jews.131  
The claims of the dissident groups raised a legitimate point; the Arab leadership 
and some members of the AE in particular were willing participants in the land sales. 
This began to be more widely known around the time these new political groups began to 
emerge. The Hope-Simpson report had not discussed Arab collaboration in Jewish land 
sales, though the British tried to take various initiatives to alleviate the land problem. The 
Protection of Cultivators Ordinance of 1929, a British-sponsored initiative, required a 
series of administrative and bureaucratic steps for the completion of a sale. The AE 
rejected the measure publicly, demanding a full prohibition of land sales. The reality was 
that compliance with British policies would lead to greater transparency and expose AE 
participation. Two of its members, Mughannam Mughannam, a Christian Arab from 
Jerusalem, and Fakhri al-Nashashibi, served as intermediaries in the sale of 8,000 dunams 
at Wadi Qabani, though there was no internal censure to match the Executive’s public 
outcry.132 British official Lewis French issued a report in 1931 confirming the 
involvement of AE members in land sales. The official response of the AE focused on 
Jewish exclusivity in labor practices and the lack of unoccupied land with subsistence-
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viable plots. There was some ‘mild condemnation’ of land brokers and sellers but no 
denial of French’s findings which had publicized the complicity of the AE members.133 
The issue of land sales relates to a larger and less discussed feature of the early 
Palestinian national movement - Arab collaboration with Zionism. This was not 
uncommon during the mandate era; however, defining collaboration is not a simple 
proposition. As Hillel Cohen has said, differing views over whether or not someone is a 
traitor are essentially part of the debate over what constitutes the national interest: “A 
further inquiry into these rival claims reveals that, although they disagree about which 
acts constitute treason, all agree on one principle: the determining factor is whether the 
actions taken are for or against the national interest. The argument between the two sides 
is, in fact, over the nature of the national interest at a given point in time.”134 As the Arab 
situation in Palestine became more desperate in the 1930s, charges of collaboration 
intensified. During the revolt at the end of the decade, Arabs deemed too moderate or not 
militant enough were often branded with this label. 
Determining who was a collaborator is beyond the scope of this paper; it is also 
very difficult to come to any firm conclusion because such accusations were often 
politically motivated and therefore potentially less credible. The point is that the 
continuation of Jewish land purchase was broadly regarded as an activity whose 
consequences ran counter to the Palestinian Arab national interests. The official AE 
stance, the Mufti’s speeches, and the British reports all recognized that land sales, when 
allowed to continue unchecked, had a detrimental effect on the Palestinian national 
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movement. The accusations leveled by the Patriotic Arab Association were significant 
because a radicalized voice was accusing the traditional leaders of an activity that hurt the 
national interest.  
More than any other organization al-Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) 
personified the newly evolving political structure in Palestine. The party was anti-Zionist, 
anti-British and critical of the elite Jerusalem families and a‘yan politics. It called for 
boycotting British taxes and revived the pan-Arab idea with its call to join Palestine and 
Syria.135 The Istiqlal leaders – Akram Zu‘aytir, ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi, ‘Izzat Darwaza and 
Ahmad al-Shuqayri – came from Nablus and the northern districts of Palestine. They 
were bankers, lawyers, journalists and schoolteachers. Some were members of wealthy 
provincial families, but the party was distinct from the elite ruling families in 
Jerusalem.136 Istiqlal raised populist issues such as unemployment, taxation, and the 
plight of the fellahin, while demanding the election of a national parliament and the end 
of feudal titles like pasha, bey and effendi.137 The rhetoric of the party aimed to mobilize 
the lower classes across Palestine as opposed to a particular village or clan, and its broad-
based ideological approach was a novelty for Palestinian Arab politics.  
The leaders of Istiqlal were not new to the political scene, but more importantly 
they were not closely associated with the Jerusalem families. ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi of 
Jenin had served as a member of the Hijaz delegation and as an assistant to Faisal at the 
Paris Peace Conference. ‘Izzat Darwaza was from Nablus and had also been active in 
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Arab politics after the war when he rallied for union with Syria. More recently he had 
convinced the Nablus MCA to change its name to the Patriotic Arab Association. 138  
While Istiqlal was the most important new Palestinian organization in the early 
1930s, the most prominent individual dissident was ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a radical 
shaykh based in Haifa. He had attended al-Azhar University in Cairo and fought against 
the French in Syria in 1919-20. He denounced the AE leaders as insufficiently militant 
and he criticized the SMC for spending waqf funds on mosque repairs instead of arms.139 
He decried the Jews and the British as infidels and called for jihad against both.140  His 
message of militancy, piety, sacrifice, unity and patriotism was based on a compelling 
mixture of the glorification of historic Islamic militants and a pointed nationalist critique 
of the deteriorating status of the Palestinians under the mandate.141  Qassam’s message 
resonated particularly with the impoverished Arabs living in shanty towns outside Haifa. 
Often illiterate and unskilled, these laborers were marginalized by the urban professional 
classes and the traditional landed elite. Qassam reached out to the lower classes by 
teaching literacy and religion courses at local mosques in Haifa.142   
So far, Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the AE members had avoided confronting the 
British authorities directly. The AE had boycotted or rejected mandate initiatives 
throughout the 1920s. This did not impede British governance, but rather reinforced the 
status quo of no official Arab representation. By the early 1930s the AE was in a bad 
position and was quickly losing popular support. It had been unable either to stem the tide 
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of Zionism or to win concessions from the British. The Executive’s incorporation of the 
mu‘aradah in 1928 had not ended internal factionalism and family feuds, and it had not 
remedied the basic issues affecting the fellahin. The Mufti held a religious position and 
while holding firm against Zionism, he too had avoided direct confrontation with the 
government. This is not surprising since British support had been integral in his rise to 
power.  
Qassam and his followers and Istiqlal were both important influences on the 
Palestinian national moment in the early to mid-1930s. They emerged at a time when the 
Arab public was losing patience with its leadership, and the leadership was losing 
patience with the British. In these circumstances, the new forces were significant because 
they advocated more extreme political positions, such as challenging British authority, as 
well as alternative means for framing the discourse of the national movement. For 
Qassam, the national struggle was cast in Islamic terms; for Istiqlal the framework was 
pan-Arabism. Islam and Arabism were not new concepts and it was probably their 
ubiquitous nature that made them viable forms for the expression of national identity. 
Furthermore, these ideas were not viewed as mutually exclusive of each other or 
necessarily in direct competition with a specifically Palestinian nationalism. Kimmerling 
and Migdal write that, “Often these varying ideas were not recognized as clashing. 
Darwaza at the same time supported pan-Arabism, Islamicism, and an increased 
dedication to the Palestinian nationalist ideal.”143 It seems that Qassam and Istiqlal used 
different methods of framing the Palestinian national struggle as a way to advocate 
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political alternatives to a status quo that had failed to provide any substantive gains for 
the Palestinian Arab people. 
The AE did make some attempts to mollify the situation. With the increase in land 
sales in the 1930s, members of the Executive and MCA representatives toured the 
villages to explain the dangers of land sales and the collective consequences of the 
decision to sell. The AE also paid Arab lawyers who were involved in legal disputes over 
the eviction of Arab tenants from land that had been purchased by Jews.144 Between 1932 
and 1934 the National Fund operated under the AE as an Arab land-purchasing agency. It 
attempted to counter Jewish buyers by giving Arabs an alternative to selling their land to 
Jews. However, it was inundated with far more offers than it could handle and made no 
purchases after 1933.145 The sincerity of these efforts is questionable because, as the 
French Report indicated, a number of AE members had profited directly as either sellers 
or land brokers. 
The SMC also tried to help the Arab cause by purchasing parts of musha’ 
holdings. As partial owners of musha’ land the council would have the ability to block 
sales and a SMC stake would make the plots less attractive to Jewish buyers, or at least 
that was the logic. In late 1934 Hajj Amin himself began personally visiting regions 
where land transfers were high, using fierce Islamic rhetoric to warn of the danger of land 
sales.146  The Mufti’s newspaper, al-Jami‘ah al-‘Arabiyyah, called the land issue “one of 
the greatest dangers that threatens the future of our country.”147  
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Neither the SMC nor the AE could change the harsh reality facing the Arab 
population. There was a major recession in Palestine between 1928 and 1932 and then 
Jewish immigration greatly increased between 1933 and 1936. Immigration had dipped 
below 5,000 in 1931 in the aftermath of the Wailing Wall riots, but the number rose to 
over 30,000 in 1933 and peaked at just less than 62,000 in 1935.148 Although the 
economy of Palestine was technically expanding, it benefitted the Jewish immigrants 
disproportionately since they received preferential treatment in hiring in the growing 
coastal cities like Haifa. This fueled resentment among the Arab population. The 
financial situation of peasant families had improved little; it is estimated that by 1936 the 
average Arab family had a debt equaling or exceeding its annual income. Land 
transactions were becoming increasingly violent and police were frequently called to 
remove tenants that resisted eviction.149  
By 1936 the land situation in Palestinian society remained problematic not only 
for those who had been forced to sell, but also for those who managed to keep their land: 
the distribution had become extremely inequitable. According to a survey, 0.2 percent of 
individual plots of land were over 1,000 dunams; this amounted to 27.5 percent of the 
total land area. 8 percent of the plots surveyed, 35.8 percent of the total land area, were 
between 100 and 1,000 dunams. The remaining 91.8 percent of plots were under 100 
dunams and accounted for 36.7 percent of the land area. The minimum amount of land 
needed for subsistence was between 80 and 90 dunams, and of the plots under 100 
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dunams, the majority were actually less than 40 dunams.150 Therefore, the majority of 
land available was held by a relatively small fraction of all Palestinian landowners. Small 
landowners far outnumbered large landowners, though they held a disproportionately 
small share of total land and the size of their holdings was often insufficient for their own 
subsistence needs.  
 
Radicalization 
 It would be inaccurate to say that Palestinian Arab society became more united in 
the mid to late 1930s, since in many ways it was as divided as ever. Christians and 
Muslims shared a tense coexistence. The Nashashibi-Husayni rivalry was becoming 
intractable. The economic, social and political divide between the a‘yan and the fellahin 
was growing. Yet at the same time, there was an overall radicalization of the political 
spectrum that had similar effects on all of the groups. The AE had been uncooperative 
with the British in the first decade of the mandate, but also generally non-confrontational. 
There had been few civil disturbances between 1922 and 1929. In the early 1930s this 
began to change as the AE adopted a more defiant stance.  
In August 1931 some senior members of the AE joined in radical demonstrations. 
Jamal al-Husyani led a demonstration at Government House. The protest led to the jailing 
of some members of the National Arab Society. In 1933 the Arab Youth Congress staged 
the Non-Cooperation Congress (Mu‘atmar al-La-ta‘awun) in Jaffa. The Youth Congress 
favored disengagement from the British, the resignation of public officials and civil 
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disobedience.151 The participation of the Executive at the conference indicated a growing 
radicalization on its part and foreshadowed the more dramatic steps it would take that 
fall. In October, at the urging of Istiqlal and other militant groups, the AE called for 
demonstrations in Jerusalem and Jaffa. Clashes with British police ensued resulting in the 
injury of some of the protesters. Most significant was Musa Kazim, now in his eighties, 
marching at the front of the procession.  It is difficult to say just why Musa Kazim and 
other AE leaders joined the radical ranks. They were probably wary of being further 
weakened by their radical challengers and they were certainly frustrated after more than a 
decade of political stagnation.  
The case of the Mufti is more complex but valuable for understanding the 
political tensions at work in Palestinian Arab society. He had built a strong position for 
himself during the 1920s. The establishment, expansion, and preservation of his power 
were the result of a unique mix of his aura as a militant nationalist leader, his initially 
amenable attitude toward British rule and his family’s control over the AE and the SMC. 
The first two bases of support were contradictory. The third appeared strong but was 
actually quite fragile. All three began to unravel after 1930. 
After generally abstaining from politics in the 1920s, the Mufti became more 
openly critical of the AE in the 1930s in an attempt to expand his political influence. 
There was growing rift between Hajj Amin and Musa Kazim. The Mufti had tried to win 
the presidency of the Arab delegation which traveled to London in 1930, but was denied 
                                                          
151





by an alliance between Musa Kazim and the Nashashibi opposition, both of whom were 
wary of his growing ambition.152  
Hajj Amin used al-Jami‘ah al-‘Arabiyyah to criticize the AE as too moderate. He 
attacked its members as traitors and spies, chiding them as ‘frail ghosts’ for their 
unwillingness to confront the authorities. Even more damaging was the newspaper’s use 
of the French Report’s findings that members of the AE were involved in land sales.153 
By 1932 his attacks on the AE had strained relations with Musa Kazim, fraying the one 
fragile tie between the Husaynis and the opposition.  
But this was not Hajj Amin’s biggest problem. It was the contradiction between 
his militant anti-Zionist image and his compliance with the British. In the eyes of the 
Arab public the AE had years of failure to its name. Hajj Amin did not, though his mettle 
had seldom been tested since the Nabi Musa riots in 1920, due to his decision not to 
engage in politics. This allowed his militant image to endure. His reputation remained 
intact even after his failed diplomacy with the British after the Wailing Wall riots. 
Though he had been denied the presidency of the 1930 delegation to London, he had still 
participated in the mission, which, in light of the MacDonald Letter, was roundly 
condemned as a failure. Elpeleg notes the double standard for Hajj Amin and the AE. 
Although Haj Amin had participated in the political moves in 1930 and had not 
given in to pressures to discontinue his cooperation with the authorities, he was 
not held to blame. In the public consciousness, he was seen as representing the 
militant line. Members of the Arab Executive faced criticism from the general 
public for having chosen to lobby the British, and they were condemned for 
having abandoned armed organization.154   
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Hajj Amin’s young supporters figured prominently at the Nablus Conference in 
1931, just as he was stepping up his attacks on the AE. But the Mufti was treading a fine 
line. In 1932 he reached an agreement with the British government to obtain additional 
funding for the SMC. As the decade continued he remained critical of Zionism but was 
even more hesitant to attack the British.155     
One of the planks of the Non-Cooperation Congress was the resignation of public 
office holders. Hajj Amin tried to pacify the crowd and calmly refused to resign: “Were 
the country to benefit from my resignation, then the issue would be a simple matter. And 
if the day comes when my resignation will be of benefit, I will have no difficulty in 
submitting it.”156 Still, he had to deal with the growing radical tide and the dilemma it 
posed regarding his relations with the British. The unrest of the October 1933 protests 
had spread to other Palestinian cities. The Mufti was in India at the time for a General 
Islamic Congress and was spared from having to confront the situation directly, but the 
British Government still looked to him to calm the public. He met expectations by 
persuading the organizers of the protest scheduled for the following January to seek 
government permission and refrain from clashing with the British.157 The High 
Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, was pleased with Hajj Amin: “The Mufti exercised 
his great authority over the fellahin to stop them heeding the extremists.”158  
Hajj Amin discouraged open attacks on the colonial government not only because 
he wanted to protect his status with the British, but also because he was suspicious of 
radical elements that operated independent of his control. He made every attempt to quiet 
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Istiqlal. He dismissed ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi, the general secretary of Istiqlal, from his post 
as lawyer of the SMC. Also, the Mufti’s supporters revealed that ‘Abd al-Hadi had 
facilitated Jewish land purchase by giving legal advice in the 1920s.159 He directed a 
wider campaign against the Istiqlal members, who lacked the organization or political 
machinery to fight back. By the end of 1933 Istiqlal’s impact was greatly diminished.160   
The Mufti was also suspicious of ‘Izz al-Din al-Qassam, though he was less able 
to quiet the radical shaykh whose operations in Haifa were beyond his reach. In the 
1920s, Hajj Amin had denied the shaykh a preaching job with the SMC after Qassam 
requested that waqf funds be spent on weapons. In 1933 Qassam had one of his followers 
ask Hajj Amin to start a revolt in the south to match his own in the north. The Mufti 
reportedly refused.161 He had too much at stake to challenge the British, far more than 
Qassam. The Mufti, however, did surreptitiously support any radical action that he could 
control. He sometimes used al-Jami‘ah al-‘Arabiyyah to incite the public against the 
British. He took no action against al-Jihad al-Muqaddas, a radical militia started by 
Musa Kazim’s son ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni in 1931. Hajj Amin learned about it in 
1934, but made no efforts to shut it down. In fact, he secretly took control of the 
organization himself in 1935.162  
The Mufti had held the mantle of militant nationalist leader throughout the 1920s, 
even though this persona was accompanied by relatively little direct action on his part. 
By the mid-1930s it was clear he no longer held a monopoly on militant nationalism, as 
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he found himself challenged by the likes of Istiqlal and Qassam. Because of their lesser 
standing, Hajj Amin’s challengers had far more latitude than him when it came to 
supporting militant rhetoric with radical action. It was the risk of being outflanked that 
contributed to Hajj Amin’s growing extremism and eventual downfall.  
In 1934 Musa Kazim al-Husayni passed away, effectively ending the Arab 
Executive which had become weaker with each passing year. Even though the AE had 
floundered during his tenure, Musa Kazim had been a steady presence in holding the 
Husaynis and the opposition together. Also in 1934, Raghib al-Nashashibi lost his post as 
mayor of Jerusalem when the Husaynis and Khalidis joined forces to back an opposition 
candidate. Neither of these developments boded well for Palestinian Arab unity. In 1934-
35 competing Palestinian Arab political parties began to form based on the existing 
factions. The Husaynis formed the Palestine Arab Party. Led by Jamal al-Husayni, the 
party rejected the Balfour Declaration, called for an end to land sales and immigration, 
and favored the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine.163 The National 
Defense Party, led by Raghib al-Nashashibi, favored an independent Palestine and 
cooperation with the British. It also instituted ties with King Abdullah of Transjordan and 
opposed Hajj Amin and pan-Arabism. The Reform Party was led by the Khalidi family. 
Although its rhetoric was anti-Zionist and pan-Arabist, it was more moderate in practice. 
Like the National Defense Party, it favored relations with Abdullah. The National Bloc 
Party was led by ‘Abd al-Latif Salah. Based in and around Nablus it favored moderation 
towards the mandate government.164  
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Two developments in 1935-36 ended hopes for a peaceful resolution of the 
situation. First, was the last real attempt to form a legislative council. Sir Arthur 
Wauchope held talks with Palestinian leaders in July 1935 to discuss the possibility of a 
legislative council. The informal proposal, which underwent modifications, was for a 
council of twenty-eight members. It would include five British officials with proportional 
representation for religious groups: eleven Muslims (three nominated), three Christians 
(two nominated) and eight Jews (five nominated), as well as a nominee to represent 
commercial interests. The High Commissioner would retain considerable latitude 
including the power to veto bills, issue laws and dissolve the council. Istiqlal opposed the 
idea of a council. The five other Palestinian parties formed a common front in November 
1935 and accepted the formal offer that the British made the following month. Even as 
the Arab leadership accepted the offer, their position was moving away from 
accommodation. In late November they demanded prohibition of land transfer, a 
complete halt on immigration and a democratic government,165 conditions that the 
mandate government was most unlikely to accept. The result was paradoxical: the default 
Arab line repudiated the essential terms of the mandate, just as the Arab leadership was 
prepared to cooperate and form a legislative council.  
The Christian Arab leadership approved the measure in March 1936. The 
moderate parties – the National Defense Party and National Bloc – also supported it. The 
Palestine Arab Party did not reject the plan, though Jamal al-Husayni criticized it, and 
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Istiqlal remained opposed.166 The legislative council never materialized; the proposal was 
defeated during the British parliamentary debates of 1936. These debates were influenced 
by pro-Zionist members of parliament and there appeared to be limited understanding of, 
or support for, the Arab position.167 An Arab delegation planned to leave for London in 
April 1936, but it stayed in Palestine to deal with the situation on the ground which had 
reached a tipping point. 
 As political efforts were under way, Shaykh Qassam left Haifa with a small 
group of followers in November 1935. He had begun launching attacks against Jewish 
settlers as early as 1931, but at this point he wanted to incite a larger rebellion.168 British 
police suspected Qassam of involvement in the recent murder of a Jewish settler and 
surrounded him and his followers in the village of Shaykh Zayd. Qassam and three others 
were killed in a gun battle on November 20.169 His death transformed him into a national 
martyr; his funeral in Haifa drew over 3,000 mourners and led to “a strong wave of Arab 
patriotic emotion.”170   
Qassam’s death was a major catalyst for the Palestinian Arab Revolt and it was 
his followers that sparked the first stage of the rebellion. On 15 April 1936, Ikhwan al-
Qassam killed two Jews in an ambush. Haganah, the Jewish militia, responded by killing 
two Palestinians. On April 19 the Istiqlal leaders declared a general strike. The other 
Arab leaders quickly formed the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) with Hajj Amin al-
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Husayni as president. The Committee called for an end to immigration and land transfer, 
and the establishment of a national government with a representative council.171 The 
AHC included all the major political parties: two members of Istiqlal, ‘Awni ‘Abd al-
Hadi(secretary) and Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, the president of the Arab Bank (treasurer); 
Raghib al-Nashashibi and Ya‘qub al-Farraj (National Defense Party); Jamal al-Husayni 
and Alfred Rock (Palestine Arab Party); Dr. Husayn Fakhri (Reform Party); ‘Abd al-Latif 
Salah (National Bloc) and Ya‘qub al-Ghusayn (Youth Congress).172 The AHC members 
were still suspicious of each other, though they were united in their desire to maintain 
control of the national movement. 
The general strike had widespread public support. The Jaffa port workers, the 
Arab Chamber of Commerce, and six municipal councils joined the strike. Arab officials 
working for the mandate government did not participate, although they pledged a tenth of 
their salaries. National committees were set up throughout Palestine and became food 
distribution centers for the strikers, while women’s committees provided relief to poorer 
families.173  
Although the AHC provided direction in this first stage, the revolt had strong 
grassroots support that was largely independent of the traditional elite leadership. In the 
countryside, recruitment, command, planning and proceeded on a piecemeal basis. 
Fighters were recruited by family or clan leaders and village elders – sometimes as 
volunteers and other times as conscripts. Peasant families contributed food, shelter, and 
their young men to the cause.  Rebel guerilla bands (fasa’il) attacked British civil 
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servants and Jews, often operating independently of any larger national command 
structure.  Local forces knew the terrain and could attack quickly and unexpectedly and 
they could also evade British detection by blending into the villages.174 By the summer, 
permanent bands of fifty to seventy men formed full-time resistance forces under regional 
commanders. The most distinguished of these was ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, the rebel 
commander in the Jerusalem area.175 However, there were still disputes between rebel 
commanders and their respective local forces. This was complicated by the entry of 
outside Arab fighters like Fawzi al-Qawuqji. Born in Beirut and recently discharged from 
the Iraqi army, Qawuqji was already a seasoned veteran176 when he entered Palestine in 
late August 1936 and declared himself commander of the General Arab Revolt in 
Southern Syria.177 Qawuqji’s choice of title – and the fact that his force of two hundred 
were Syrians, Iraqis and Transjordanians, rather than Palestinians – indicated that 
Palestine was becoming an Arab issue as opposed to a strictly Palestinian one.  
In the first six months of the revolt 80 Jews and 197 Arabs were killed, as well as 
38 British.178 The strike had not been as effective as the Arab leadership had hoped. 
Many Arabs that had worked for Jewish companies were simply replaced by Jewish 
laborers and in this sense the strike consolidated the Jewish position. Thousands of 
Palestinians had been arrested and the British had not yielded to their demands. A new 
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Jewish immigration quota was announced on May 18. It was reduced from previous 
levels, though it was not the full stoppage that the AHC had demanded. The AHC leaders 
did not want to appear weak by accommodating the British, but they also did not want to 
continue the strike, which was costly to the Arab population. There was also concern 
about the effect that the strike would have on the approaching citrus harvest. They found 
a way out in October when the Arab leaders from other countries persuaded the 
Committee to call off the strike by brokering a deal with British government. By agreeing 
to their request the AHC was able to end the strike by cooperating with other Arab 
leaders rather than appearing to surrender to the British authorities.  
In November, a Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel began an investigation 
into the causes of the riots. The Zionists in Palestine cooperated fully with the 
commission. They demanded unlimited immigration and land transfer. The Palestinians 
initially boycotted the commission but the Mufti later testified before it, again at the 
behest of outside Arab leaders. His position was unchanged. He demanded an 
independent Arab state in Palestine and an end to Jewish immigration. 
The Peel Report, published in July 1937, was a radical departure from previous 
British policy. Citing irreconcilable differences between Arabs and Jews, it recommended 
that Palestine be partitioned into two separate states.  The Jewish state would include the 
northern region of Galilee, including Acre, Haifa, and Nazareth and the Jezreel Plain to 
the south, as well as the coastal plain from the north of Acre to the south of Jaffa. There 
would be an elliptical strip of land forming a corridor from Jaffa westwards to Jerusalem 
and Bethlehem, which would remain under British control. The Arabs were granted the 




desert, south to the Gulf of Aqaba (see Figure 2). The commission recommended that the 
Arab state be placed under the overall control of Transjordan. The Zionists accepted the 
plan publicly but they were clearly displeased with the proposal. The AHC rejected the 
plan entirely.  
At this time some Zionists favored a transfer program under which large numbers 
of Arabs would be relocated to areas outside Palestine, thereby facilitating the creation of 
Jewish national home. This was one possible course of action that was considered as part 
of the Zionist response to the Peel plan. In November 1937, months after the Peel Report 
was published, the Zionist Executive established a Transfer Committee. The chair of the 
committee, Yosef Weitz, called for the transfer of much of the rural Arab population 
either to the Arab state (as proposed by the partition plan) or possibly to Transjordan, 
Syria or Iraq. 
The goal was to open up land for Zionist settlement.  The plan lost its momentum 
as the British retreated from the partition plan and moved towards the idea of a bi-
national state.179 This demonstrates a clear difference in the diplomatic mentalities of the 
two sides. Even though the Zionist leadership was displeased with the plan, they quickly 
considered alternative strategies to maximize their position. The Arab leadership 
maintained its same strategy even as its position grew weaker.    
The second phase of the revolt began with assassination of Lewis Andrews, the 
Acting District Commissioner of Galilee on September 26. British officials immediately 
disbanded the AHC. Over 200 Palestinians were arrested, including members of the 
AHC, SMC and national committees. Many members of the AHC managed to evade the 
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Figure 2. The Peel Commission Partition Plan, 1937. From A History of the Israeli-    
Palestinian Conflict, 2nd ed. by Mark Tessler. Copyright © 2009 University of 
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British authorities. Hajj Amin al-Husayni escaped to Lebanon, Jamal al-Husayni to Syria. 
‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi, ‘Izzat Darwaza, Alfred Rock and ‘Abd al-Latif Salah were all 
traveling abroad on diplomatic missions at the time and they avoided prosecution by not 
returning.180  
With many of the established leaders forced into exile, the leadership of the revolt 
shifted to the peasants. The rebels obtained arms by seizing police stations. They 
destroyed telephone and railroad lines, and set up various institutions to organize the 
resistance. The Higher Council of Command was formed in 1938. The rebels also created 
a system of courts and systems for supplies, taxation and arms and some rebel leaders 
established new laws and regulations.181 They succeeded in taking control of Jaffa for 
several months and controlled Nablus, Hebron, Bethlehem and Ramallah at the peak of 
the revolt in 1938.182 By September ‘the situation was such that civil administration and 
control of the countryside was, to all practical purposes, nonexistent.’183  
Although the British lost control of the countryside and some cities and towns, the 
Palestinian resistance was devoid of any unified leadership at the end of 1937 and for 
much of 1938. Upstart rebel institutions did not amount to effective central command, 
and the regional guerilla leaders were as factionalized as the elites of the AHC. ‘Abd al-
Rahim al-Hajj Muhammad, the nominal commander-in-chief, led a band of 50 rebels in 
military operations around the Nablus-Jenin region, but this was only a small fraction of 
the roughly 2,000 full-time Arab guerillas operating in Palestine at the time. He tried to 
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co-opt other rebel leaders by controlling arms distribution and rebel military courts.184  
‘Arif ‘Abd al-Razzaq controlled the rebel effort in Tulkarm and Ramallah and was 
bitterly opposed to al-Hajj Muhammad. ‘Abd al-Razzaq became known as a ruthless hit 
man for Hajj Amin al-Husayni, usually targeting Palestinians who were deemed too 
moderate.  ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, who had fled at the end of the general strike, 
returned to Palestine in the spring of 1938. By August he controlled the revolt in the 
Hebron and Jerusalem areas.185 These commanders and other rebel leaders were 
distrustful of each other and lacking in any overall coordination or common vision.  
The Mufti’s rejection of the partition plan, his dismissal from the SMC, and his 
subsequent exile had increased his popularity with peasants and rebels throughout 
Palestine. He tried to use his influence to subordinate the rebel groups to a central 
command. He attempted to do this with the Central Committee for National Jihad, a 
Damascus-based group set up by ‘Izzat Darwaza, but this was difficult to do from abroad. 
Fawzi al-Qawuqji, who had fled in the fall of 1936, returned in the spring of 1938. The 
Central Committee reached out to him as a potential supreme commander. He refused the 
position but it is unlikely that the rebels would have submitted to a foreign commander 
anyway.186 Hajj Amin did keep up attacks on his rivals through his operatives in 
Palestine. In November 1938 ‘Abd al-Razzaq’s men assassinated Hasan Sidqi al-Dajani, 
a Nashashibi supporter.187 Raghib al-Nashashibi himself moved to Cairo to avoid a 
similar fate. Fakhri al-Nashashibi, meanwhile, spent much of 1938 organizing counter-
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rebel bands. The revolt finally subsided in early 1939, but not before 20,000 British 
troops had been dispatched to restore order.  
The Arab Revolt was a watershed in the history of the Palestinian national 
movement and one that encapsulates many facets of the history of the Palestine mandate. 
One of these was the culmination of a trend that had been years in the making – the 
peasantry acting independently of the notable leadership. During the revolt the peasantry 
expressed its frustration with the ruling class and carried out many of its operations 
without the direction of the traditional elites. This was the case not only in the second 
stage of the rebellion but in many ways from the very beginning. In October 1936, 
Wauchope wrote that the general strike had begun “independently and spontaneously in 
various places by various committees” on April 20-21. The AHC had formed in response 
to other groups, calling for the strike four days later on April 25.188 Raghib al-Nashashibi 
also recognized the changing scenario. On May 5, 1936 he said “the tension in the 
country was great and the attitude of the leaders was dictated by the pressure brought to 
bear upon them by the nation. The people…were ruling the leaders and not the leaders 
ruling the people”.189 Nashashibi may have been trying to deny culpability and maintain 
his moderate position with the British; even so, his statement speaks volumes about the 
changes underway in Palestinian Arab society. The events of the Arab Revolt 
demonstrated the lower classes’ frustration with the ruling elites, particularly moderates 
like the Nashashibis and their allies. Once the AHC was outlawed in 1937, the peasants 
unmistakably became the center of the resistance. Sir Harold MacMichael, who assumed 
the office in March 1938, observed that, “Something like a social revolution on a small 
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scale is beginning. The influence of the landlord-politician is on the wane.”190 Subsequent 
research seems to support MacMichael’s observation. Based on an empirical study of 
rebel officeholders, Porath writes, “The conclusion is clear: the Revolt was carried out 
mainly by Muslim villagers of the lower strata, the participation of urban, educated or 
notable families being rather slight.”191 
 The events of the revolt and the findings of the Peel Report confirmed what had 
long been the case; that the national aspirations of Jews and Arabs were simply 
incompatible, as both had visions for the future of Palestine that ran counter to each 
other. By this time it was also clear that some of the divisions within Palestinian Arab 
society were almost equally irreconcilable, and that the traditional hierarchy and power 
structure that supported the leadership had failed to advance the national cause. Yet there 
was no real possibility of a political realignment within Palestinian society. While there 
was clear antipathy between the rural rebel groups and the a‘yan and other urban Arabs, 
there was nothing like an elected national assembly that could be used for the reallocation 
of power. Even if there was, the majority of rebel bands lacked the resources, knowledge 
and political savvy which would be needed to petition the British. In one way or another, 
the existing leaders had exhausted their political capital. The Mufti had renewed his 
militant nationalist credentials in the eyes of many Palestinians, but this came at a high 
cost. In addition to geographical displacement resulting from his forced exile, Hajj Amin 
no longer had the institutional prestige and financial support that the Supreme Muslim 
Council had afforded him. He also had accumulated many enemies by this point. Raghib 
al-Nashashibi was on better terms with the British authorities, though his moderate 
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political views were out of step with the radical shifts in Palestinian opinion. The Mufti’s 
loyalists and many other Palestinians regarded al-Nashashibi as a collaborator. He was 
certainly moderate and more willing to compromise, as he had privately favored partition 
in the hope that he would rule Arab Palestine under Transjordan.  
 
Intervention by the Arab States 
For all their differences, the Palestinian leaders all had begun looking to the 
surrounding Arab countries for a political solution which they themselves had been 
unable to deliver. The moderate wing of the AHC, Nashashibi’s National Defense Party 
and the National Bloc Party, had favored closer relations with Abdullah before the 
outbreak of the revolt. On the other end of the spectrum, Istiqlal called for a pan-Arab 
solution to the Palestinian predicament. The Peel Report’s recommendation for a 
Palestinian Arab state under Jordanian control indicates that the British were also looking 
to the other Arab nations for a solution. Thus the Palestinian national leadership and the 
mandate government both began to seek greater Arab involvement for help in mediating 
the situation. The lack of a viable alternative leadership from within Palestinian society 
made this a logical choice. 
   Arab kings from Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen were instrumental 
in reaching a deal to end to the general strike in the fall of 1936. It was they who had 
petitioned the AHC on behalf of the British authorities and it was their participation 
which let the Committee appear to be heeding the call of other Arabs rather than 
capitulating to British pressure. But their brokering of a truce did not necessarily mean 




Palestinian leadership in its rejection of British proposals. In August 1937, a conference 
of four hundred Arab delegates met at Bludan in Syria and issued a unanimous rejection 
of the Peel Commission plan. This event did not escape the attention of the British 
Foreign Office.192 The Arab leaders were also invited to the 1939 London conference that 
resulted in the British issuing a new White Paper. Palestinians participated (e.g. Jamal al-
Husayni and ‘Awni ‘Abd al-Hadi; Hajj Amin was banned), though the British hoped that 
the Egyptian, Iraqi, and Saudi delegates would persuade the Palestinians to accept a 
compromise.193 The British certainly wanted to find a solution to the Palestine issue, but 
they were also beginning to view Palestine through the prism of regional politics. Other 
Arab states were clearly taking an interest in the situation and the British began to see the 
Palestine issue as a vehicle for preserving their standing in the region. This was even 
more true after the outbreak of World War II.  
The British support for a greater Arab role was a key element in reshaping the 
political agenda surrounding the Palestinian national movement, but the British were not 
the prime motivators in this process.  It was the Palestinian leaders who appealed to the 
Arab leaders for assistance and tried to win support from the general public in other Arab 
countries. After the disbanding of the AHC, some Palestinian notables sent messages to 
the Iraqi, Egyptian, and Saudi kings asking them to ‘rescue the Arabs of Palestine’. Hajj 
Amin sent two representatives to Egypt, where they publicized the Palestinian cause and 
contacted government officials.194 The exile of many Palestinian leaders further 
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necessitated the support of other Arab regimes, as they often took refuge in neighboring 
Arab countries.  
In general, the Palestinian cause gained support in surrounding countries. In 
Egypt, the Higher Committee for the Relief of Palestine Victims was organized between 
1936 and1939 with the support of leaders from the Young Men's Muslim Association, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and the Liberal Constitutional Party. In July 1936 the Egyptian 
Parliament passed resolutions supporting the “Palestinian nation” and the Egyptian Prime 
Minister voiced his concerns to the British government.195 In Iraq, the Iraqi Palestine 
Defense Committee was established to lead a propaganda campaign. This committee had 
persuaded Fawzi al-Qawuqji to resign his commission in the Iraqi army to fight in 
Palestine and the Iraqi government provided rifles and transportation for him and his 
troops.196  
The issue of Palestine also featured prominently at regional conferences. The 
Inter-Parliamentary Arab Congress was held on 7 October 1938 in Cairo, a week after the 
British outlawed the AHC. Organized by the Egyptian Palestine Defense Parliamentary 
Committee, the conference attracted over sixty members of parliament from Egypt, Syria 
and Iraq.  This pattern continued after the Palestinian Revolt ended. The Alexandria 
Protocol, a resolution passed at a 1944 meeting of Arab leaders, called for the foundation 
of a league of independent Arab states. It also stated “that Palestine constitutes an 
important part of the Arab world and that the rights of Arabs [in Palestine] cannot be 
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touched without prejudice to the peace and stability of the Arab world.”197 Some 
historians believe the events in Palestine in the late 1930s were “perhaps the single most 
important factor which contributed to the growth of pan-Arab ideology, to the feeling of 
solidarity among the Arab peoples and to the attempt at shaping a unified general Arab 
position and policy.”198 Pan-Arab or Arab nationalist ideology was shaped by series of 
events in many countries and the rise of this political sentiment is not solely attributable 
to the Palestinian Arab Revolt. However, the Palestinian issue was definitely becoming a 
focal point in regard to a unified Arab policy and for solidarity among Arabs across the 
Middle East. 
What did this all mean for the Palestinian national movement and how did it 
affect the national leadership? Here it is useful to return to Gellner’s observation of 
nationalism as a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be 
congruent. For over fifteen years there had been little question as to what political and 
national units were under consideration. With the end of the Faisal era and the beginning 
of British administration in Palestine, the Arabs of Palestine were administered as one 
political unit. The traditional leadership, mostly the Jerusalem a‘yan, sought greater 
legitimacy and power within the political and geographical confines of the mandate. The 
matter of collective identity among the population – its identification as a national unit – 
had largely been determined by contemporary political realities. There were certainly 
persisting village, clan and family alliances, but to some degree at least, Palestinian Arabs 
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developed a national identity that was distinct from that of other Arabs because they were 
being administered as one political unit. The Istiqlal leaders and Qassam had used pan-
Arabism and Islamism respectively in order to frame the political goals of the national 
movement. Although these were extra-territorial sources of identity, the political focus of 
their activity was still inside of Palestine and concerned with Palestinian national issues 
such as Jewish immigration, land purchase, and dealing with the mandate government.  
The increase in outside Arab involvement was the beginning of a process in 
which the Palestinian Arab leadership would lose control of the national agenda. For the 
next thirty years, the Palestinian leaders were supplanted by outside Arab leaders as the 
main dynamos of the national movement. This process accelerated after the partition of 
Palestine in 1947 and the subsequent establishment of Israel in 1948. This was not 
entirely unlike the situation after World War I, when Faisal represented the Palestinians 
before the Allies in Paris. However, there was a critical difference. In 1918 the political 
and national units in question were somewhat amorphous. The mandates had put some 
distance between the national experiences of the peoples in different Arab countries and 
the Palestine mandate had a unique set of political problems different from that of the 
others. The assistance of the Arab leaders was needed and sought after by Palestinian 
leaders, but it complicated the task of the national leadership because it added other 
parties to a contentious situation that was already marred by too many interests that could 
not agree on what was to be done. There were divisions between Palestinian leaders, and 
between the a‘yan and the fellahin. There were also differences between British officials 
and Zionist leaders, and though not discussed here, there were multiple factions within 




London for both groups. A similar divide was taking place on the Arab side, though the 
consequences of diluting the Palestinian national leadership were far more damaging than 
it was for the British and Zionist sides. The continuation of the existing mandate policy 
had corrosive and ultimately irreversible effects on the Arab position in Palestine. Arab 
involvement, though badly needed, added to the plurality of voices on the Palestinian side 
and it made it even harder to form a united national front.  
The conduct of the traditional leaders had hardly been exemplary. With the 
exception of the strike, they had generally failed to cooperate amongst themselves, 
allowing personal feuds to override the possible emergence of a unified national voice. 
But at least they had been native residents of Palestine with a clear stake in the future of 
the land. Arab empathy for the Palestinians was genuine and their financial, military, and 
political support was borne out of legitimate concern for their fellow Arabs. Arab 
involvement resulted in an increase in the range of political options available. This was 
welcome and perhaps necessary, as Palestinian society was shorn of better options, but it 


















In the late Ottoman era, Arab life in Palestine had been characterized by a fairly 
well-defined social and political hierarchy. This era was marked by the presence of the 
a‘yan as a powerful class of urban notables who acquired vast tracts of land that were 
usually worked by the fellahin. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to an increase in 
the possible sources of national identification for the Arabs of Palestine, and various 
political options for the future of the territory. 
At the end of World War I, the Arab of Palestine derived their primary identity 
from a variety of sources: clan, village, family and religion. There was no strong or 
widespread sentiment of Palestinian nationalism and the political options for the future of 
the region were not strictly limited to the idea of a Palestinian entity. This possibility 
competed with the idea of including Palestine as a province of a larger independent Arab 
state based in Damascus. In the brief span between the end of the war and the beginning 
of the British Mandate, the future of Palestine was influenced by British and French 
imperial designs, the Zionist agenda, and various Arab leaders, some of whom were local 
and others who resided outside of the area. Palestine was proposed either for inclusion as 




The inception of the British Mandate for Palestine rendered the territory into a 
single political unit and led to the creation of specifically Palestinian institutions, such as 
the AE and SMC. The Palestinian leadership consisted mostly of the same Arab leaders 
of the late Ottoman era – the Jerusalem a‘yan and their families. The Palestinian leaders 
were often at odds with each other and unsuccessful in establishing an Arab 
representative council. 
There were also national experiences that were unique to the Palestinians. Most 
notable was the encountering of Jewish immigration and experiencing the effects of 
Jewish land purchases. 1929 was the year of Arab-Jewish riots at Jerusalem’s Western 
Wall. The riots were not the first civil disturbances in Palestine, though as the British 
investigations found, they indicated systemic problems in the situation of the Palestinian 
Arab population – anger and resentment over Jewish land purchase and immigration, and 
frustrated national aspirations.  
The British conclusions were essentially correct. From 1920 through 1935, 
Palestinian Arab society was riddled with divisions among the ruling class, the a‘yan, and 
by socioeconomic changes that affected the lower classes. These changes were closely 
linked to the persistence of Jewish immigration and land purchase, which further 
exacerbated the longstanding social inequalities in Arab society. The Palestinian Arab 
Revolt of the late 1930s was the culmination of lower class frustration with the ruling 
elites. The disenchanted fellahin and other rebels took an active role in the uprising, 
acting independently of the a‘yan. Also during this time, advocacy of the Palestinian 
issue shifted from the local Arab leaders to those of the neighboring Arab countries in a 




The decade after the Western Wall riots was a tumultuous one. In many ways the 
situation did not change. Jewish land purchase and immigration were still the main issues 
affecting the Palestinian people and the leading families were still deeply divided. The 
absence of any solution to the issue of Jewish land acquisition was a major reason for the 
fragmentation of the Palestinian national movement. It was an issue that concerned 
virtually all Palestinian Arabs, and opposition to land transfer was widespread amongst 
the people. However, it did not affect all social classes in the same way. Jewish land 
purchases aggravated an already dysfunctional land system and deepened existing 
schisms in Arab society. Small landowners sold to escape debt. Large landowners mostly 
profited from land sales, though their decision to sell led to the eviction of tenant farmers 
and a created a class of landless Arabs. Thus, while Arab concern over land purchases 
contributed to the rise of a popular national consciousness, concerted action to stop land 
purchases was virtually impossible and actually caused divisions within the national 
movement. Individual motives, the desire for profit and plain desperation combined to 
undermine the collective national interest. 
The land issue was troubling, though at least it was somewhat quantifiable in that 
it dealt with ownership of physical space. A more ambiguous issue was the question of 
just what political and national units were being considered. The idea of nationalism was a 
relatively new concept in the Middle East. At the dawn of the mandate the Arabs of 
Palestine derived their identities from a variety of sources including religion, village, 
family and clan. For many Arabs, particularly the less educated rural dwellers, their idea 
of loyalty or allegiance often did not extend beyond the village in which they were raised. 




their efforts often focused on local power struggles rather than national progress. They 
frequently demonstrated their antipathy for one another and their disregard for the lower 
classes, rather than their unanimity as fellow Palestinians. Beside the more limited notions 
of collective identity, Palestinian nationalism and identity was competing with the idea of 
a greater Arab identity that linked the Palestinians to the surrounding territories. This 
notion of all Arabs as constituting a national entity gained popularity and influence in 
political discussion; almost immediately after World War I the idea of including Palestine 
as part of a southern Syrian province garnered considerable support. This idea receded 
with the inauguration of the mandate. Later some groups began to advocate a greater Arab 
political solution to the Palestinian problem. Istiqlal, for example, was a political 
organization that cast the Palestinian issue as a pan-Arab one. The rise of pan-Arabism in 
the 1930s did not crystallize around support for one potentially viable outside Arab leader. 
For the Palestinians of the 1930s there was no political equivalent of Faisal. Rather, pan-
Arabism revolved around a common identification as Arabs and the Palestinians’ growing 
dependence on the other Arab states. Indeed, during the revolt Palestinians found 
financial, military, and diplomatic support from other Arab leaders and their 
constituencies. For their part, the Arab leaders rallied in support of the Palestinians, while 
beginning to replace them as the main political advocates of the Palestinian cause.  Almost 
simultaneously, guerilla bands from the countryside were laying siege to Palestinian cities, 
targeting moderate Arabs, and warring with rebels from other villages. As a result, 
Palestinian nationalism was competing with both narrower and broader options for 




One reason for the different notions of national identity was because the options 
that were available came from a political framework that was externally imposed. The 
possibility of a single unified Arab state was the main incentive that the British had used 
to recruit Sharif Husayn of Mecca to lead an Arab Revolt against the Turks and the same 
idea was behind their support of Faisal’s short-lived government in Syria. The victorious 
Allied powers looked to Faisal as spokesman for the Palestinian Arabs and the 
Palestinians petitioned Faisal accordingly. A similar pattern recurred later on when the 
Arab states intervened to end the Palestinian Revolt. The outside Arab role was the result 
of a combination of Western powers appealing to the Arab states and Palestinians 
requesting the help of other Arab leaders. While pan-Arab sentiment remained, the 
national experiences of the Palestinians and other Arab peoples had diverged 
considerably by this point. Other Arab states could assist the Palestinians, but it was the 
Palestinians alone who would be adversely affected by the continued absence of a 
political solution, and of a viable political leadership to act on their behalf. 
A great deal has changed in the Palestine issue since 1939. Palestine has not been 
a unified political territory for more than sixty years. Britain has long been replaced by 
the United States as the main Western power in Arab-Israeli relations. Pan-Arab 
sentiment lost much of its support after the crushing defeat of 1967. Today there is little 
ambiguity over Palestinian national identity. Palestinians who have been living in exile 
for generations still identify strongly with their homeland. The same is true of their 
children, though many of them have never visited the region. Yet there are still striking 
similarities between the issues that confronted the early national movement and the ones 




Currently, the Palestinian leadership is deeply divided. Fatah has been at the 
forefront of the national movement for decades, but it has problems. To some observers, 
the party is symbolic of failed leadership, corruption, and overeagerness to comply with 
US demands. Moreover, its hold on the national movement has slipped in recent years. 
Fatah had been the premiere party since it took control of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) in 1969, but it finished second to rival Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian 
general elections. After nearly two decades on the militant fringe of Palestinian politics, 
Hamas staked its claim to the leadership of the national movement with a victory in the 
2006 elections. It now controls the Gaza Strip, but to some extent, the organization finds 
itself caught between its militant ideology and the practical needs of governing.  
The situation of these groups is reminiscent of that which frustrated the 
Palestinian leadership in the first two decades of the mandate. Both are bound by limits in 
their range of political options, with a possible backlash if they exceed those limits. 
Mahmoud Abbas, Fatah’s leader, is currently president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), 
the provisional Palestinian government. If he compromises with the US and Israel, he 
may come under political attack from Hamas. If he does not, he will remain a leader with 
nothing to show for his efforts. If Hamas moderates its tone it risks an internal divide 
between its militant and more pragmatic members, and it might also be challenged by 
more radical fringe groups. Yet if it continues in its refusal to recognize Israel, Hamas 
will remain isolated from the peace process. The existing status quo makes it difficult for 
either group to make bold changes in their political positions without significant risk to 
their stakes in the national movement. These stakes have little value, however, if there is 




worth little if it comes at the cost of the ultimate national goal of a sovereign Palestinian 
state.  
There is also some similarity between the current situation and that of the 
mandate era in regard to the key issues of land and population. As was the case then, the 
absence of an agreement that addresses these areas contributes to the erosion of the 
Palestinian position. The two main issues of the mandate were immigration and land 
purchase. The former shifted the demographics of the population in Palestine away from 
the Arab majority, while the latter reduced the amount of land under Arab control. Now a 
similar struggle is taking place in the West Bank, where construction of Jewish 
settlements has continued since 1967. In the process, Palestinian land has been 
expropriated, settlements have been built, and settlers have taken up residence in the area. 
Beginning in 1993 the Oslo peace process was supposed to lead to a final peace 
agreement. It has not led to a final agreement and in the meantime the confiscation of 
land and construction of settlements has continued largely unabated.  
The issues confronting the Palestinian national leadership in 1920 were similar to 
those that it faced in 1937. In essence, the issues were the same, the situation much 
worse.  History is repeating itself for the Palestinians. The issues are much the same 
today as they were in 1993, but the task of resolving them is ever more difficult. There 
are hundreds of thousands of Israelis living in settlements in the West Bank. The 
settlements are a profound obstacle to any proposals for a future Palestinian state. As the 
number of settlers increases through natural population growth and new migration, it 




dismantling the settlements has already proven to be an extremely contentious issue in 
Israeli politics, and their continued growth further complicates the problem. 
During the mandate the Zionists faced a formidable struggle. They had to 
establish “facts on the ground” by creating a physical presence that made the Jewish 
national home a reality. The aspirations of Zionism culminated in the establishment of 
Israel in 1948. The Jewish state has survived and generally prospered for over sixty years 
despite hostile and tense relations with its Arab neighbors. Today, the facts on the ground 
are changing once again and the fate of the Palestinians is being threatened. Gaining 
control of the land and establishing a demographic presence in Palestine was a process 
that enabled the realization of Zionist goals. The construction of settlements is not 
necessary for the creation of a Jewish national home, because a Jewish state already 
exists in Palestine. The process that led to the fulfillment of one national people is 
threatening the future of another.  
This thesis has argued for a deeper understanding of the early history of the 
Palestinian national movement. The Palestinian Arab leaders were generally 
uncooperative with the mandate government and ultimately unsuccessful in dealing with 
the political obstacles they faced. In addition, there were various social and economic 
changes in Arab society which complicated the task at hand. There were reasons that they 
chose not to cooperate, but there was no reward for the lack of a political solution. It is 
important to understand why the national movement developed as it did and the nature of 
the obstacles it experienced. The same is true today. There are reasons that the Palestinian 
leadership does not compromise on certain points, but there is no incentive for presiding 




Palestinian national movement and how those issues affect its decision-making is 
























al-Dajani, ‘Arif (1856-1930) – Mayor of Jerusalem during World War I. Founding 
member of the Muslim-Christian Association in Jerusalem. Elected the first vice-
president of the Arab Executive in 1920.  
Darwaza, Muhammad ‘Izzat (1889-1985) - Influential member of the Arab Club after 
World War I. Helped establish the Istiqlal Party in 1932.  
Faisal, ibn Husayn (1883-1933) - Son of the Sharif. Part of the Arab Revolt against the 
Ottoman Empire. Main Arab representative to the European powers after World War I. 
Later served as King of Iraq (1921-33).  
al-Ghusayn, Ya‘qub (1899-1947) – Leader of the National Congress of Arab Youth. 
Member of the Arab Higher Committee. 
 ‘Abd al-Hadi, Awni (1889-1970) – Member of the Arab Executive in the 1920s and 
early 1930s. Member of Istiqlal and the Arab Higher Committee.    
 Husayn, ibn ‘Ali (1853-1931) – Sharif of Mecca. Ruler of the Hijaz. Launched the Arab 
Revolt against the Ottoman army in 1916.                 
 al-Husayni, ‘Abd al-Qadir (1908-1948) – Son of Musa Kazim al-Husayni. Founded 
Munazzamat al-Jihad al-Muqaddas (Organization for the Holy Struggle). Guerilla 
commander in the Jerusalem area during the Palestinian Arab Revolt. 
 al-Husayni, al-Hajj Amin (1895-1974) – President of the Supreme Muslim Council and 
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (1921-37). Elected as President of the Arab Club in 1918 and 
President of the Arab Higher Committee in 1936.   
 al-Husayni, Jamal (1892-1982) – Served as secretary of the Arab Executive and Supreme 
Muslim Council during the British mandate. President of the Palestine Arab Party.  




 al-Husayni, Musa Kazim (1850?-1934) – Served in various government positions in the 
Ottoman Empire from 1892 to 1913. Mayor of Jerusalem (1918-20). President of the 
Arab Executive (1920-34). Led several Arab delegations to London between 1921 and 
1930.   
MacMichael, Sir Harold (1882-1969) – British High Commissioner of Palestine (1938-
44).  
 McMahon, Sir Henry (1862-1949) – British High Commissioner of Egypt (1915-17). 
Exchanged a series of letters with Sharif Husayn concerning the future of the Middle 
East.  
al-Nashashibi, Raghib (1883-1951) – Led the opposition movement to the Husayni 
family. Mayor of Jerusalem (1920-34). Founded the National Defense Party in 1934. 
Member of the Arab Higher Committee.   
al-Nashashibi, Fakrhri (1899-1941) – Nephew of Raghib al-Nashashibi. Key member of 
the opposition movement. Member in the Literary Society and later the National Defense 
Party.  
al-Qassam, ‘Izz al-Din (1880?-1935) – Radical shaykh based in Haifa. Called for armed 
resistance to the mandate. Died in a confrontation with British police. His followers 
formed the Qassam Brotherhood.      
 Rock, Alfred (1885-1956) – Member of the Palestine Arab Party and the Arab Higher 
Committee. 
Samuel, Sir Herbert (1870-1963) – British High Commissioner of Palestine (1920-25).  
Wauchope, Sir Arthur (1874-1937) – British High Commissioner of Palestine (1931-38). 
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